Resolving Land Disputes through Restitution Dynamics: A Comparative Analysis of Country Case Studies by University of Chicago Law School - Global Human Rights Clinic,
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
International Human Rights Clinic Law School Clinics
2017
Resolving Land Disputes through Restitution
Dynamics: A Comparative Analysis of Country
Case Studies
University of Chicago Law School - International Human Rights Clinic
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/ihrc
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Clinics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
International Human Rights Clinic by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
University of Chicago Law School - International Human Rights Clinic, "Resolving Land Disputes through Restitution Dynamics: A
Comparative Analysis of Country Case Studies" (2017). International Human Rights Clinic. 2.
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/ihrc/2
		
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2019 International Human Rights Clinic 
All rights reserved. 
ISBN 978-1-7334730-3-3 
 
University of Chicago Law School 
Mandel Legal Aid Clinic 
6020 South University Avenue 
Chicago, Illinois 60637 
 
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/ihrc 
		
	
	
1	
	
TABLE	OF	CONTENTS	
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	 4 
INTRODUCTION	 10 
PART I: BACKGROUND	 10 
PART II: LAND TENURE DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES	12 
1) FUNDAMENTALS OF LAND TENURE	 12 
A. FORMAL TENURE	 12 
B. CUSTOMARY TENURE	 12 
2) LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS	 13 
3) AVAILABLE MECHANISMS FOR LAND RESTITUTION	 14 
A. RESTORATION	 14 
B. COMPENSATION (MONETARY)	 14 
C. COMPENSATION (LAND)	 15 
4) LAND GRIEVANCES IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS	 15 
5) INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON LAND OWNERSHIP	 16 
A. EXPLICIT RIGHT TO LAND: INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS	 16 
B. NON-DISCRIMINATION: WOMEN’S EQUAL RIGHT TO OWN LAND	 17 
C. FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED TO LAND	 19 
PART III: DOMESTIC FACTORS RELATED TO LAND CONFLICT	 21 
1) SEIZURE OF LAND	 21 
A. LAND SEIZURE BY THE GOVERNMENT	 21 
B. INVOLVEMENT OF THE BUSINESS SECTOR AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT	 21 
2) DISPLACEMENT DUE TO ETHNIC CONFLICT	 22 
3) REGIONAL COMPLEXITIES	 22 
A. COMPETING POLITICAL ENTITIES	 23 
B. VARYING USES OF LAND ACROSS REGIONS	 24 
C. REGIONAL LAND COMPLEXITIES	 25 
PART IV: RELEVANT DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK	 25 
1) CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS	 26 
2) LEGISLATIVE PROTECTIONS	 27 
A. THE FARMLAND LAW	 27 
		
	
	
2	
B. THE 2012 VACANT, FALLOW AND VIRGIN LAND MANAGEMENT LAW (VFVL)	 27 
C. PREVIOUS LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS AT ADDRESSING LAND RESTITUTION	 28 
PART V: COMPARATIVE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES	 29 
1) INTRODUCTION	 29 
2) ASSESSMENT TOOLS FOR COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES	 29 
A. THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES	 29 
B. ALTERNATIVE PRINCIPLES: THE VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES	 32 
3) CASE STUDY 1: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	 32 
A. BACKGROUND	 32 
B. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CLAIMS	 33 
C. POLICY AND LEGAL RESPONSES	 34 
D. LESSONS LEARNED	 36 
4) CASE STUDY 2: EAST TIMOR	 36 
A. BACKGROUND	 36 
B. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CLAIMS	 37 
C. POLICY AND LEGAL RESPONSES	 38 
D. LESSONS LEARNED	 40 
5) CASE STUDY 3: INDONESIA	 40 
A. BACKGROUND	 40 
B. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CLAIMS	 41 
C. POLICY AND LEGAL RESPONSES	 41 
D. LESSONS LEARNED	 43 
6) CASE STUDY 4: IRAQ	 43 
A. BACKGROUND	 43 
B. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CLAIMS	 45 
C. POLICY AND LEGAL RESPONSES	 45 
D. LESSONS LEARNED	 48 
7) CASE STUDY 5: KOSOVO	 49 
A. BACKGROUND	 49 
B. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CLAIMS	 50 
C. POLICY AND LEGAL RESPONSES	 51 
D. LESSONS LEARNED	 53 
8) CASE STUDY 6: ZIMBABWE	 54 
A. BACKGROUND	 54 
B. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CLAIMS	 55 
C. POLICY AND LEGAL RESPONSES	 55 
D. LESSONS LEARNED	 57 
		
	
	
3	
PART VI: OVERALL LESSONS LEARNED	 58 
APPENDIX: ASSESSMENT CHART	 67 
	
	 	
		
	
	
4	
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   
	
This Report aims to support current efforts in Myanmar to address land ownership and land 
use disputes. Shifts in government administration, inconsistent legal property regimes, 
inadequate administrative recordkeeping, and unregulated government land seizures have 
resulted in wide spread conflicting claims to land. These have caused regional instability, 
internal population displacement, conflict and socio-economic distress. Resolution of these 
disputes through a restitution mechanism and establishment of a cohesive land ownership 
and use regime is central to ultimately establishing rule of law and respect for human rights 
as well as to the long-term economic development of Myanmar.  
 
As stakeholders engage in discussions about whether, when, and how to adopt a land 
restitution program as a component of more comprehensive land reform policies, best 
practices and lessons learned from other countries can provide useful reference points. This 
Report provides that research using international law and best practices as the analysis 
framework. Six comparable countries - Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), East Timor, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, and Zimbabwe - were selected for investigation due to relevant 
similarities to Myanmar’s context. These comparators represent post-conflict and/or post-
colonial environments; have a significant number of refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs); and/or have substantial regional variation throughout the country that calls 
for a land restitution approach that incorporates relevant regional distinctions.  
	
v Bosnia & Herzegovina established a land restitution mechanism following regional 
conflict in the 1990s. The mechanism sought to incorporate regional historical 
practices into restitution mechanisms, account for potential local obstruction, and 
address claims on residential and non-residential land.  
v East Timor undertook land restitution after the conclusion of internal conflict. 
Lacking a robust land governance infrastructure, the process focused on interim 
measures, informal mediation, and incorporation of customary tenure. 
v Indonesia has sought to recognize the rights of unregistered owners that are insecure 
and that heavily impact traditional communities. It is in the process of 
comprehensively reforming its legal and regulatory framework. 
v Iraq attempted to establish a land restitution program following the 2003 overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein. Ongoing violence and conflict presented a severe challenge as did 
the failure to undertake an integrated, cohesive, and inclusive approach. The selection 
of a former judicial process also proved more cumbersome and slower than an 
administrative one.  
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v Kosovo’s process mirrored that of BiH but had unintentional discriminatory effects 
on ethnic groups. It also was hampered by poor cooperation and interaction between 
agencies, particularly at the outset of the land restitution program. 
v Zimbabwe undertook radical land reform in an attempt to establish equity between 
ethnically “white” landowners and “black” farmers. The process was marred with 
numerous challenges and lead to various human rights violations.  It also 
demonstrated the difficulties with purely consensual land reform policies.  
 
Using international frameworks such as the UN Principles on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (Pinheiro Principles) as guidance, this report 
identifies twenty-two principles that measure the efficacy and success of these restitution 
programs. Through this analysis, various practices and considerations for Myanmar emerge 
as described in detail below. 
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	 Summary of Lessons Learned1 
 
1. Define the Scope: Properly defining the scope and providing a clear timeline for land restitution 
efforts facilitates effective implementation. 
 
2.  Flexibility and Evolution: Approaches that are flexible and change as needs evolve tend to be more 
impactful. 
 
3. Determine Formality of Mechanism: Administrative, judicial, or informal approaches or some 
combination of the three should be used as appropriate to the particular context. 
 
4. Incorporate Traditional Land Rights: Traditional land rights should be accounted for in 
restitution mechanisms. 
 
5. Consider Use of Customary Institutions: Traditional, local, and/or customary institutions can 
provide fora for implementation of a restitution mechanism. 
  
6. Adopt Local, Regional and Federal Approach: Local, regional and federal strategies should be 
incorporated into a land restitution policy to ensure proper coordination. 
 
7. Consider a Staggered Approach: Where stability of the country and capacity of the government is 
not reliable,  mechanisms that upscale in stages may be preferable.   
 
8. Account for Long-Term Institution Building: Long-term institution building should be a 
component of mechanism to ensure sustainability and effective transitions. 
 
9. Potential for Interim Protections: Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of interim and 
transitional protections which may provide more immediate needed relief.  
 
10. Land Restoration or Compensation: The type of redress provided should be tailored to community, 
needs and circumstances of recipient and take into account relevant factors such as use of land and 
access to financial institutions.  
   
11. Consider Implications of Definitional Choices: Making deliberate choices about legal definitions 
to avoid unintended future consequences. 
 
12. Resolve Existing Conflict of Land Laws and Policy: A survey of existing land laws and policies 
should identify inconsistent or conflicting laws and either remedy them or identify which take priority. 
 
 
13. Address Human Rights and Ensure Non-Discrimination: Design of a mechanism should include 
ongoing assessment of potential for discrimination and adverse human rights impact in compliance 
with international standards.	
																																																						
1 For complete lessons learned, see Section VI. 	
		
Summary Assessment Chart  2 
 
ASSESSMENT OF LAND RESTITUTION EFFORTS BASED ON   
UN PRINCIPLES ON HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 
(PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES)) 
 
 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
Success Moderate Moderate Too soon to tell No Low-moderate No 
Transparency Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate N/A 
Public access 
facilitated by state 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 
Transparency 
(creation) 
N/A Transparent Relatively 
transparent 
Low N/A High 
Transparency 
(individual 
disputes) 
N/A Relatively 
transparent 
N/A High N/A N/A 
Non-
discrimination 
High Moderate Moderate Low Low-moderate Low 
Gender-sensitivity Low N/A N/A Low Low  N/A 
Eligible property All All land Agrarian land All real estate 
Residential N/A 
Proper staffing Yes Yes Too soon to tell No Yes No 
																																																						
2	For detailed Assessment Chart, see Appendix A.	
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
Proper funding Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Agency 
independence  
High Moderate Moderate Moderate: High Low 
Standardized 
process 
Yes At the outset, 
yes 
Unclear Yes Yes No 
Submission of IDP 
Claims 
High Low-moderate N/A N/A High N/A 
Resolution of IDP 
Claims 
High N/A N/A Low High Moderate 
Community 
consultation 
N/A High Moderate Low Low Low 
Land registration 
mechanism 
Moderate N/A High, but 
ineffective 
High Moderate N/A 
Recognition of 
customary land 
High High High Low Low Low 
Recognition of 
undocumented 
claims 
N/A N/A N/A Low N/A N/A 
Recognition of 
secondary 
occupants 
Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes No 
Rule of law Yes Yes  
Yes Yes Yes No 
Clear restitution 
prioritization  
Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes No 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
Favored form of 
restitution  
Restoration Selling, leasing, 
dividing, or 
swapping land 
Restoration Restoratio
n 
Restoration N/A  
Independence, if 
monetary 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Opportunity for 
compensation, if 
restoration 
No N/A No No 
 
Sometimes N/A 
		
INTRODUCTION1 
  
Reform of land governance and tenure systems in countries emerging from conflict can 
present numerous challenges. Myanmar is currently undergoing a political reform process 
that is transitioning the nation from an era of strong state control towards relative 
democracy. Although the economy is rapidly developing, Myanmar continues to face multiple 
prolonged internal conflicts, such as the ongoing crisis involving the Muslims in Rakhine 
State. Along with political transition comes widespread social and economic changes as well 
as legal and institutional reform. Land governance and dispute resolution systems in a post-
conflict society merit careful planning and focused implementation. However, since myriad 
societal transformations that affect land tenure are occurring simultaneously, forming an 
effective approach to issues of land governance can be complicated.  While each reform 
process faces unique challenges and dynamics, comparative case studies and international 
guidance can serve as useful touchstones.  This report seeks to support land restitution, land 
reform, and dispute resolution efforts in Myanmar through an exploration of comparative 
case studies and international standards.  
 
The report proceeds in five parts: Part I provides a brief summary of the socio-political 
climate of Myanmar in which property determinations are taking place; Part II discusses the 
relevant international legal landscape; Part III explores domestic factors in Myanmar that 
relate to its attempts to undertake land restitution and land reform; Part IV summarizes 
applicable domestic laws; Part V presents comparative case studies from six countries 
(Bosnia & Herzegovina, East Timor, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, and Zimbabwe) with relevant 
recent experiences with land restitution and land reform; and Part VI concludes by 
synthesizing insights and lessons learned in these countries to the Myanmar context. 
	
PART I: BACKGROUND 
  
In 1948, the then Union of Burma, a political formation comprised of many previously quasi-
independent territories, declared independence from Britain and became a parliamentary 
democracy.2 However, the Union of Burma suffered from ongoing ethnic strife that still 
persists today.3 During the 1947 Panglong Conference Aung San, head of interim Burmese 
government, met with ethnic minority leaders to discuss unification.4 Aung San and ethnic 
leaders agreed that the new Union of Burma would be governed in a model that would retain 
significant autonomy and rights for ethnic minority areas, and in return these ethnic 
minorities would be loyal to the new state. 5  However, in 1947, when Aung San was 
assassinated by a rival for the country’s leadership, Panglong was set aside and the new state 
was created in the midst of civil war.6  
 
Following independence from the United Kingdom, the Union first operated as a 
representative democracy.7 This government lasted until the military coup of 1962, when the 
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armed forces took power from the parliamentary government and replaced it with a military 
junta.8  The coup, led by General U	 Ne Win, led to isolationist policies with a socialist 
economic program.9 In response to a rapidly deteriorating economy, mass protests occurred 
in August of 1988 and the army killed at least three thousand protestors.10 Ne Win resigned 
and military junta succeeded in a coup a month later.11 
 
Following two decades fraught with domestic political protests and international sanctions, 
a general election was held in 2010.12 In 2011, the military junta was officially dissolved and 
a civilian government was installed.13 The government signed the National Ceasefire Accord 
with eight armed ethnic groups in October of 2015.14 In November 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
party, the National League for Democracy, won a landslide election victory.15    
 
Myanmar’s transition to democracy has come with the need for various reforms, in particular 
related to land restitution and land claim dispute resolution. A history of complex and 
inconsistent property allocation and ownership regimes as well as government seizures of 
private property have led to conditions of competing claims on land that are difficult to 
resolve. The resolution of these claims is complicated by a number of factors that vary greatly 
from region to region, including a lack of administrative records on land ownership and use; 
power imbalances at various levels of society; human rights abuses; and a rapid increase in 
foreign investment.16 
 
Moreover, as a result of decades of civil conflict, Myanmar has a high population of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs). After the signing of the October 2015 ceasefire, displaced peoples 
in the southeast are beginning to consider the prospects of returning home, and finding their 
land confiscated and transferred to private companies or otherwise occupied by individuals 
with competing land claims.17 The northeast faces a different set of challenges. Only eight 
ethnic armed groups signed the ceasefire; many of the militarily powerful groups did not sign, 
and there is intense fighting in the northeast. 18  This violent conflict is causing new 
displacement. As Myanmar works towards building peace and sustainable development, 
resolution of land tenure disputes and restitution is crucial.  
	
	 	
		
	
	
12	
PART II: LAND TENURE DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES 
 
1) FUNDAMENTALS OF LAND TENURE   
 
Land tenure, as defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), is “the relationship 
. . . among people . . . with respect to land and other resources.”19 In general terms, land 
tenure systems determine who can use the resource of land, for how long, and under what 
conditions. The rules of land tenure vary across and within countries, and disagreements 
regarding these rules are often at the heart of land conflict.  
 
There are generally four categories of rights in land tenure mechanisms: (1) private, (2) 
communal, (3) open access, and (4) state.20 Private rights are assigned to a private party, 
while communal rights allow each member of the community to use the land and resources 
of the community (but non-community members may be excluded). Open access describes a 
tenure where specific rights are not assigned to any individual but no one can be excluded, 
and state tenure is when rights are assigned to a public sector entity, either for public purpose 
use or for leasing to earn an income.21  
 
Land is often governed by two forms of tenure—statutory (or formal) tenure and customary 
tenure.  
	
A. Formal Tenure 
 
Statutory tenure includes freehold, leasehold, public, and private rental, with freehold rights 
being the strongest form of statutory rights. Forms of statutory tenure are regulated by the 
government, laws, and institutions, and land rights are usually registered in land 
administration systems. 22  On a spectrum of land tenure, registered freeholds have the 
greatest security of tenure, meaning that the land users with this land tenure have the most 
confidence that they will not be deprived of the rights they enjoy over land and the economic 
benefits that flow from it.23 However, many countries also have customary tenures instead 
of, or in addition to, statutory tenure.  
 
B. Customary Tenure 
 
Customary tenure includes multiple forms of community land rights and resource access and 
use rights; these rights are vested in a community, ethnic group, or family.24 Unlike statutory 
tenures, which are regulated by the state, customary land rights are controlled by traditional 
authorities such as chiefs and elders. While statutory land rights have legal legitimacy, 
customary land rights sometimes have legal legitimacy, and sometimes just enjoy widespread 
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social legitimacy.25 Customary tenure is the predominant form of tenure in many rural areas 
and indigenous communities.26  
	
Advantages to customary tenure are wide social acceptance and practice in certain parts of 
the world. Customary tenure is simple to administer and readily adaptable to changing 
circumstances, including conflict, and these institutions may be more resilient after conflict.27 
On the other hand, the advantages of customary tenure lend themselves to limitations. For 
example, the simplicity of customary institutions may cause them to more easily break down 
during conflict and lose legitimacy.28  
 
Both customary and statutory tenure schemes can raise various concerns about 
accountability and human rights, specifically women’s rights. Often, customary land rights 
may not be enforced in court, which contributes to insecurity of tenure. In addition, the 
accountability of traditional authorities, the managers of land under customary tenure, may 
be weak or may become weak.29 When this happens, there is little recourse through federal 
government mechanisms and this allows potential for abuse by customary leaders in 
resolving claims. However, diminished trust in institutions in conflict areas and widespread 
corruption mean that similar problems can arise with statutory tenure as well. 30 
Furthermore, women’s land rights are often secured through male relations under systems 
of customary tenure, exacerbating the inequality between men’s and women’s access to 
land.31 As discussed in Part II.4.B, statutory tenure schemes often result in bias against 
women, as well, for example by favoring male heads of household when registering land. 
	
2) LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
Land tenure, as described above, is to be distinguished from property rights. The rules of 
tenure regulate people’s and organizations’ relationship to land, whether legally or 
customarily defined, and thus they define how property rights to land are to be allocated 
within society.32 Property rights include rights to use, control, and transfer land, as well as 
responsibilities and restraints associated with these land property rights.33 Property rights 
define and are more commonly recognized and protected by statutory law and can include 
rights over physical objects, such as houses.34 In sum, land tenure determines how land is 
used, possessed, leveraged, sold, or disposed of, whereas property rights concretely define 
rights to land of individuals, communities and organizations.35  
 
The term “housing, land, and property rights” (HLP) is often used by the humanitarian sector 
in conflict situations.36 The concept of HLP is captured in international human rights law 
within the right to adequate housing.37 This term is designed to ensure that vulnerable 
groups are not excluded from protection, and to ensure that all housing, land, and property 
rights are respected and protected in times of insecurity and conflict.38  
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3) AVAILABLE MECHANISMS FOR LAND RESTITUTION  
  
When populations have been dispossessed of their land, there are several possibilities for 
restitution. The two primary forms of land restitution mechanisms are restoration and 
compensation.39 
 
A. Restoration  
 
Land restoration is when the dispossessed party is allowed to return to his or her own land. 
Restoration is intended to return displaced populations to the status quo and, in theory, 
undoes any forced displacement of populations and ethnic groups that occurred during a 
conflict. This is generally considered the favored type of restitution policy.40 It is favored for 
practical reasons (many countries undertaking land restitution do not have sufficient funds 
to effectively compensate all displaced persons), theoretical preferences (only restoration 
truly embodies the concept of “restorative justice” or allows individuals to “re-assert” rights 
over their land), and substantive concerns about compensation (a fear that providing money 
to displaced persons will appear as though the government is sanctioning forced 
displacement, that monetary compensation may have unintended consequences or that 
compensation may impede people from returning to land to which they may have spiritual, 
social, or cultural connections).41 Though it may be considered the better alternative, there 
are significant policy concerns about land restoration such as the unintentional 
discriminatory impact on women where informal land ownership of the male head of 
household is formalized in such a way that marginalizes female family members’ equal right 
to ownership. Another concern occurs when displaced persons originating from rural areas 
were displaced at a young age and have become accustomed to urban environments and so 
returning to their rural land does not fit their intended lifestyle.42 
	
B. Compensation (monetary) 
 
Monetary compensation occurs when a dispossessed party cannot return to his or her land 
but is provided an amount of money, generally by the government, for the land. For the 
reasons discussed, compensation is generally disfavored and is considered mainly where 
restoration is not possible or for secondary occupants (those who moved onto land in good 
faith after the original possessor was displaced); the Pinheiro Principles (later discussed) also 
suggest that the best policy can be a well-crafted balance between the two, where individuals 
have a choice to either restoration or monetary compensation.43 Besides the reasons already 
discussed for why restoration is preferred, there can be specific practical barriers to monetary 
compensation. These include a lack of knowledge by recipients in maximizing use of capital, 
investment or access to financial institutions to ensure security of compensation received.44 
		
	
	
15	
C. Compensation (land) 
 
Restoration of original land and monetary compensation are the two primary policy choices 
contemplated by literature for land restitution. Another possible approach is compensation 
not in money but rather in land such that the party receives other land to compensate for the 
previous land.45 There are practical barriers to this type of policy: for a government to 
undertake an “in kind” compensation scheme, unused land must be identified. This policy 
choice, therefore, is often undertaken as part of not just a land restitution process but a more 
ambitious land redistribution and reform. In the Zimbabwe case (discussed in detail in Part 
V.8), land was taken from “white” landowners and redistributed to “black” farmers. This type 
of land reform can also occur as part of a socialist government policy where the government 
makes land public, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo under the former 
Yugoslavia (discussed in detail in Parts V.3 and V.8) as well as a number of Latin American 
countries such as Peru and El Salvador.46 
 
4) LAND GRIEVANCES IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS  
 
Disputes over land and resources may contribute to conflict and result in delaying peace-
building post-conflict. For example, land issues have played an integral role in all but three 
of the greater-than-30 intra-state conflicts that have occurred in Africa since 1990. 47 
However, land disputes are often seen as too politically sensitive or too technically 
complicated to allow for comprehensive resolutions yet failures to resolve these disputes often 
lead to a higher chance of relapse into conflict.48     
	
Post-conflict land grievances can be sorted into two broad categories: (1) grievances related 
to access, use, and control of land and resources, and (2) grievances that relate to security of 
tenure. In the first category, common access-related disputes result from evictions or 
displacements that have forced communities to move from locations they traditionally 
inhabit, unequal distribution of land within society and land concentration among the elite, 
contested access to, and use of, fertile land, exclusive control of high-value natural resources, 
and denial of access to land with social, cultural, or religious significance or indigenous land 
claims.49 In the second category, factors contributing to insecurity of tenure include rapid 
urbanization, expansion of land markets and the individualization of land rights held under 
customary systems, non-transparent investment in, or capture and control of, land and 
resources, and new laws that are perceived to impact land rights of either elites or 
communities.50 
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5) INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON LAND OWNERSHIP  
 
As explained above, land rights include the rights to occupy, enjoy, and use land and 
resources; restrict or exclude others from land; transfer, sell, purchase, grant or loan; inherit 
or bequeath; develop or improve; rent or sublet; and benefit financially from the sale of 
crops.51  While land rights for particular groups (such as indigenous people and women) have 
been established in the international legal framework, 52  strictly speaking, there is no broad 
human right to land under international law.53  
 
However, access to land is widely accepted to be entwined with multiple human rights explicit 
in the international legal framework. As a source of livelihood, land access is integral to 
economic rights, such as the right to work. In the case of indigenous populations, land is 
linked to indigenous identities and thus land is tied to social and cultural rights. Land rights 
also serve as a basis for access to food, housing and development, water, and work—all 
fundamental human rights that are unambiguous in the international legal framework.54 In 
both urban and rural areas, people rely on the availability of adequate tracts of land for 
shelter and for resources. Particularly in rural areas, the realization of the right to food is 
tied to the availability of land on which to grow crops.  
 
More generally, human rights aspects of land affect a range of issues, including poverty 
reduction and development, peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, disaster prevention 
and recovery, and urban and rural planning. People have been forcibly evicted and displaced 
from their land to make way for large-scale development or business projects such as dams, 
mines, oil and gas installations, or ports. A shift to large-scale farming has also led to forced 
evictions and displacements in a manner that may violate the human rights of the affected 
communities.55 
 
Given that land rights are so closely entwined with multiple other human rights and overall 
stability, there are international legal implications of access to land for a broad range of 
human rights.56 
 
A. Explicit Right to Land: Indigenous Populations  
	
The first area of international law in which explicit rights to land exist is with respect to the 
rights of indigenous populations. This is a clearly stated and unqualified right to land. For 
many indigenous populations, land is not only a means to economic livelihood, but a source 
of spiritual, cultural, and social identity. In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which gives indigenous peoples 
the right to the lands, territories, and resources that they have traditionally owned, occupied, 
or otherwise used or acquired. Article 8 of the Declaration states in paragraph 2(b): 
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“States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for any 
action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or 
resources.” 
	
Myanmar voted in favor of this Declaration57 which, while not legally binding like a treaty, 
represents “the dynamic development of international legal norms and reflect[s] the 
commitment of states to move in certain directions, abiding by certain principles.”58  
 
The right to land for indigenous populations is also addressed in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); however, Myanmar is not a signatory to the covenant 
and thus is not bound by it.59 Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, adopted by 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1989, is legally binding on States, but 
Myanmar has also not ratified this convention.60 Ratification of both instruments would 
strengthen land rights of indigenous populations.  
 
B. Non-Discrimination: Women’s Equal Right to Own Land  
 
The second area of international human rights law where rights to land are explicitly 
addressed is with respect to the rights of women. Women’s equal access to land and property 
is considered an important step towards eliminating gender discrimination and promoting 
equality.61 Articles 14 (on rural women) and Article 16 (on the elimination of discrimination 
within the family) of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), ratified by Myanmar on July 22, 1997,62 address women’s equal right to 
land and participation in reform efforts.  
 
Land rights may be accessed through three main institutions – the state, the market, and 
social structures such as family or community.63 In the overwhelming majority of societies, 
women face unequal barriers in accessing and securing land rights, leading to unequal access 
to land and land tenure.64 This lack of equal access to land and property consequently 
significantly limits women’s access to wealth, economic stability and independence.   
	
Land tenure tends to reflect the distribution of power in society, and in most communities, 
men have more power than women. As such, women have weaker land rights that are rarely 
registered in law or that may be summarily revoked by men.65 Moreover, government land 
allocation schemes often favor male heads of households, as do land administration systems 
in general.66  Even if laws grant women equal rights in some respects and recognize certain 
customary laws that provide women equal rights in relation to land, as it is in Myanmar, the 
rights of many women are governed by customs that do not in fact give them equal access to 
or control over land. Myanmar has highly insecure land rights for women; this is mostly due 
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to cultural norms and practices that marginalize women within their households and 
marriages. Many women lack the knowledge that they have rights as joint owners of family 
land, or as a family member that may inherit land.  
 
Violent conflict often has a disproportionate impact on women’s right to and access to land. 
During war, the number of households headed by women increases dramatically, as men are 
recruited to fight or are displaced by conflict.67 As a result women are left to support their 
families often unable to demonstrate a legally verifiable claim to land or property which is 
often the family’s primary source of income. Women also face difficulties in accessing 
statutory dispute resolution mechanisms and an inability to access or effectively participate 
in humanitarian and recovery programs.68  
 
In paragraph 2(g) Article 14, CEDAW states that, “States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural 
development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right to “have access to 
agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate technology and equal 
treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land resettlement schemes.”69 Thus 
CEDAW requires equal treatment of women in all land reform efforts.  
	
On the issue of land ownership within the family, in paragraph 1(h) of Article 16, CEDAW 
affirms that, “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular 
shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
 
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, 
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of 
charge or for a valuable consideration.”70 
	
While land rights are not specifically referenced in Article 16, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (the “CEDAW Committee”), charged with 
interpreting CEDAW, stated in General Recommendation No. 21 that Article 16(1)(h) 
requires the following: 
 
“In countries that are undergoing a programme of agrarian reform or redistribution 
of land among groups of different ethnic origins, the right of women, regardless of 
marital status, to share such redistributed land on equal terms with men should be 
carefully observed.”  
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In sum, CEDAW requires that States ensure women the right to equal treatment in land as 
well as in land resettlement schemes. CEDAW also states that both spouses must enjoy the 
same rights with respect to the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, 
enjoyment, and disposition of property, in marriage.    
 
C. Fundamental Human Rights Related to Land  
 
Within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), there are multiple articles that implicate 
the right to own land through the protection of corollary core human rights. Myanmar has 
signed but not ratified ICESCR and so it has an obligation to refrain, in good faith, from acts 
that would defeat its object and purpose. 71 
	
Economic, social, and cultural rights covered in the UDHR and ICESCR include the rights to 
food and housing—rights that are intimately connected to access to land. The rights to food 
and housing are also deeply intertwined with women’s equality and non-discrimination – the 
inability to demonstrate legally verifiable claims to land or property, or to access or effectively 
participate in humanitarian and recovery programs, interfere with women’s right to equal 
access to land and access to housing.72 Without access to land,  food security and general 
family well-being may also be at risk. 
 
i. Right to Food  
 
The right to food is clearly affirmed within the international human rights framework. Article 
25 of the UDHR states that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care . . . .” The right to food is made explicit in Article 11 of ICESCR.73 Given that 
Myanmar has signed onto this covenant, it has an obligation to refrain from acts that defeat 
the purpose of the treaty. Therefore, Myanmar must not impede efforts to produce and 
distribute food. 
 
ii. Right to Housing 
	
The right to housing appears in several key international human rights treaties and is also 
laid out in Article 25 of the UDHR (quoted in the above section). Housing is seen as a 
fundamental right and land is often necessary to have to fulfill this right. It appears in the 
ICESCR,74 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in paragraph 3 of Article 27, and 
in the non-discrimination provisions in Article 14 of CEDAW (previously discussed in section 
B). Article 27, Paragraph 3 of the CRC states: “State Parties, in accordance with national 
conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and 
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others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide 
material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing, 
and housing.” Myanmar ratified the CRC on July 15, 1991.75 
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PART III: DOMESTIC FACTORS RELATED TO LAND CONFLICT 
	 	
There are several characteristics unique to Myanmar that must be incorporated into any 
attempt to undertake land reform and land restitution in the country. Although this Report 
cannot explore all the complexities of the country, the primary issues will be discussed in this 
Part.   
	
Among these characteristics is a history of land seizures by the government but often 
implicating the private sector and foreign investment; armed conflict that has led to 
significant displacement; and significant variation in history, culture, and land disputes 
between regions.76 
	
1) SEIZURE OF LAND 
 
The parties responsible for land confiscation in recent years in Myanmar include the military, 
non-military government departments, companies, and local authorities 5.8%.77 Confiscated 
land has been used for military projects, urban redevelopment and industrialization, and 
infrastructure and agriculture projects, as well as various other projects.78 Of the amount 
confiscated, 80% has been farm land, 8% deep water land, 7% forest land, and 5% other types 
of land.79 These figures, compiled by the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Mekong Region 
Land Governance groups, demonstrates the complex nature of land seizures in Myanmar.  
	
A. Land Seizure by the Government 
 
The government of Myanmar has engaged in land confiscation, both compensated and 
uncompensated. These “land grabs” have increased as the state continues to open its economy 
to foreign investors and pursues policies to increase industrial agricultural production. The 
central government has seized land from multiple regions across the country, but the 
majority of land seizure has occurred in the central Dry Zone and in ethnic minority areas 
rife with natural resources. The absence of reform in land tenure arrangements, coupled with 
flourishing foreign investment in land, agribusiness, and resources, has increased the 
potential for land expropriation. 
 
	
B. Involvement of the Business Sector and Foreign Investment 
 
As stated above, the agricultural and ecological diversity in Myanmar lends itself to several 
areas of land use. This makes Myanmar land an attractive investment. Many land 
concessions have been granted in the Upland areas along the Thai and Chinese borders; land 
dispossessions and loss of resource-use rights have been most prevalent there. Groups such 
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as the Mekong Region Land Governance believe that this trend stems partially from the fact 
that tenure in the uplands has been historically regulated by customary law, which is not 
formally recognized under the current legal regime.80 
 
The central plains, valleys, and deltas, where most of the ethnic Bamar majority population 
live, are the heart of Myanmar’s agriculture business. The Dry Zone of upper central 
Myanmar is supported through the growth of rice and other cash crops and most farming is 
done by small farmholders. The central government has historically been very present in the 
Ayeyarwaddy Delta, and thus frequently intervenes and shapes land distribution in the area. 
Until recently, smallholders in the Delta region were subject to prescribed quotas – if the 
farmers were unable to sell prescribed quotas to the local government, their land was 
confiscated. Much of the land procured by the government in this manner has been granted 
to agribusiness companies that invest in Myanmar.  
 
2) DISPLACEMENT DUE TO ETHNIC CONFLICT 
 
Displacement has largely been due to ongoing ethnic armed conflict in Myanmar. In some 
instances, natural resources have been a leading source of conflict. Since most natural 
resources are located in areas where ethnic military groups operate (including groups that 
have a technical ceasefire with government forces), they are a source of tension between 
regional non-state governments and the central government. Ethnic armed conflict has led 
to great amounts of displacement, with people unable to return to their lands for various 
reasons ranging from the existence of land mines to the inability to prove land claims.  
 
3) REGIONAL COMPLEXITIES  
 
There are significant differences—governmentally, culturally, ethnically, and socially—
between the different regions in Myanmar, which complicate any attempt at land reform and 
land restitution. Myanmar is divided into fifteen subsections: seven regions (Ayeyawady, 
Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Taninthayi, and Yangon); seven states (Chin, Kachin, 
Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan); and one union territory (Nay Pyi Taw).81 See Figure 
1. (In this Report, the term “regions” is used in the generic sense, and includes the regions, 
states, and territory in Myanmar). 
	
Kachin has experienced continued instability and active conflict. Ongoing conflict creates 
new displacement and exacerbates past displacement. According to the Norwegian Refugee 
Council’s March 2017 Report, Restitution in Myanmar, farmers attempting to return to land 
that they view as theirs have faced lawsuits from third parties. In addition, refugees and 
IDPs have been unable to return to their residential lands. According to some stakeholders, 
the Kachin wish to return to their customary lands; the majority would likely be unwilling to 
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accept monetary compensation. Therefore, the success of restitution is deeply connected to a 
peace agreement between the government and ethnic armed groups within Kachin. 
 
Rakhine, like Kachin, suffers from ongoing conflict and lack of a peace agreement with the 
federal government. According to USAID’s 2013 country profile of Burma, Rakhine has the 
highest proportion of landless households in western Burma. Increasing numbers of people 
have been displaced as Myanmar’s military presence has grown in the area. Like Kachin, it 
seems unlikely that a restitution solution will be reached without also reaching a peace 
agreement.  
 
Mandalay, which lies in Myanmar’s Dry Zone, is part of the country’s central heartland 
region. Most farmers in the areas are commercial farmers that grow cash crops, such as 
sesame and beans for export. Mandalay has suffered from land seizures by the government, 
allegedly for the development of infrastructure and industrial zones. Land seizure in 
Mandalay has apparently led to skyrocketing land prices. Furthermore, GRET has found 
households with lands that have been confiscated three times before by various levels of 
government, ranging from ministers to high-level military members. According to USAID’s 
2013 country profile of Burma,  Mandalay has the highest proportion of landless households 
in central Burma. In the 1970s, the former Ministry of Industry seized over 35,000 acres of 
land. Officials have said that nearly 32,000 acres have since been returned to farmers. 
	
Because of the significant variation between regions, some experts have suggested that a 
regional land restitution program is preferable to a national program.82 At minimum, many 
suggest that any national program must account for and incorporate local variations in land 
use, disputing parties, power differentials and the needs of relevant communities.     
 
A. Competing Political Entities 
	
In several of Myanmar’s regions, there are armed ethnic groups and other groups at conflict 
with the government, vying for control of the land and governance. To help understand the 
scope of this struggle: the official Myanmar government recognized sixteen dialogue partners 
at discussion on the October 2015 ceasefire agreement (four parties still have to sign the 
agreement as of May 2017), most of which were armed ethnic groups with varying and 
shifting allegiances; there were at least six other potential non-state armed groups that were 
excluded from the talks.83 Two of the primary armed ethnic groups are the Karen National 
Union (KNU) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), both of which are central to 
the ongoing peace process negotiations.84 Both groups have existed for decades—the KNU 
was formed one year before then-Burma received independence—and operate military units 
along with quasi-governmental branches.85 Although the level of conflict between the central 
government and each of these armed groups has ebbed and flowed over the years, with a 
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decrease in violence following the ceasefire in 2015, the conflicts over who is legitimate 
government in these regions are ongoing.   
 
Beyond these armed adversaries to the official government, there is also unclear delegation 
of power among the official government systems in many regions of Myanmar. State and 
regional governments are run by the partially-elected legislative hluttaw, a Chief Minister, 
and a cabinet.86 Administrative divisions and accountability mechanisms are often unclear 
at the regional level, with multiple departments seemingly having overlapping jurisdiction.87 
For example, the military still controls one-fourth of the seats in the regions.88 The lack of 
clarity concerning the power division of regional governments and ongoing influence of the 
military in these institutions further complicates the governance structures of the regions.  
	
B. Varying Uses of Land Across Regions  
 
Due to this Report’s focus on land restitution in Myanmar, a quick summary of how land is 
used in the country is helpful as context. This section is necessarily a generalization because 
of the complex and varying uses of land in the country, but can help inform the contours of 
the broader land restitution discussion. 
 
There is significant variation of land use across the country. Much of the northern “uplands” 
traditionally have depended on shifting cultivation, or “swidden” agriculture. In recent years, 
some individuals farming this land have been driven into less viable land (such as steep hills) 
as population density has increased. Most of the land is harvested with staple crops (such as 
rice), though there have also been shifts in the types of crops planted in these areas, including 
some movement into planting opium (which can be more lucrative).89 The central “dry zone” 
is generally considered the heartland agricultural area, used for commercial farming. Many 
farmers face seasonal unemployment, drought, and land degradation. 90  The southern 
Irrawaddy Delta region is the country’s primary rice growing area.91 Meanwhile, the land in 
Shan is often seized for mining and resource extraction.92 Government-promoted large-scale 
monoculture plantations, often for rubber, are mostly in Mon, Kachin, and Shan.93 The 
different way land is used in each of these regions raises different types of land disputes and 
implications for land reform and land restitution.  
 
Because different populations in Myanmar use the land in varying ways, the corresponding 
land disputes also vary. Overall, about 67% of the population in Myanmar live in rural areas 
and depend on agriculture for their livelihood.94 About 30–50% of the population in these 
rural areas is landless.95 Just under half (49%) of the land area is forest area, and about 17% 
is arable.96 Populations that depend on forest area have faced deforestation (the country lost 
about 19% of its forests from 1990 to 2010) and excessive logging, threatening traditional 
practices and sources of food.97 Myanmar residents that rely on both forests and agriculture 
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have faced displacement and compromised soil and water based on dam building, oil and 
other natural resource extraction, mining, and large-scale agriculture projects.98  
	
C. Regional Land Complexities  
 
In Myanmar, both formal and customary tenure, as discussed in Part I.2, exist. In fact, since 
1850, the federal government has at different times statutorily recognized twelve different 
forms of formal land tenure: freehold land, grant land, agricultural land, garden land, grazing 
land, culturable land, fallow land and waste land, forest land, town land, village land, 
cantonment land and monastery land.99  
 
These categories do not take into account the many forms that customary land tenure takes 
in the country, none of which currently receive formal recognition (though some did during 
the British colonial rule).100 Customary tenure is most common in the uplands. Different 
ethnic groups practice distinctive customary tenure, but it is particularly common among the 
Karen (about 7% of Myanmar’s population), who serve as a good example of the complexity 
of customary tenure. The Karen traditionally practice shifting cultivation. This practice 
entails clearing forests and then letting them regrow for about a decade before returning to 
cultivate them again, which means that land may appear to be unused for nearly a decade 
but the community is planning on returning to it once the cycle comes back around to that 
plot. 101  The Karen further delineate customary land into rotational, irrigated, orchard, 
communal, grazing, and sacred land.102  
 
An important note to these delineations is that little land in Myanmar has ever been formally 
registered. In 2007, the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation reported, for example, that 
about one-third of agricultural households had inherited their land and 20% had purchased 
it—it was unclear how the rest (about half) had obtained possession of their land.103 New 
federal laws from 2012 that attempt to address these gaps are discussed in Part IV. However, 
at the local level, a common thread has been that the hluttaws feel unable to solve land 
disputes because of a lack of formal land registration, often suggesting locals with complaints 
register their land or lodge complaints with the central government, rather than providing 
solutions themselves.104 This comes despite the fact that land registration is supposed to 
occur at the local township level, overseen by officials from the General Administration 
Department.105 
	
 
PART IV: RELEVANT DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The primary source of property rights in Myanmar is the 2008 Constitution106 which sets 
forth individual rights to property, as well the government’s obligation to protect property. 
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Following the onset of democratic reforms, the government also passed two key statutes 
governing land tenure – The Farmland Law 2012107 and the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands 
Management Law 2012.108 There is apparently no official policy or legislation on internal 
displacement in Myanmar. 109  Rather, constitutional and legislative enactments address 
property rights more broadly. Overall, the land rights structure does not insulate many 
property owners in Myanmar from arbitrary land seizures.  
 
1) Constitutional Property Rights 
 
The 2008 Constitution requires that the government respect an individual’s right to private 
property, but simultaneously gives it wide discretion to limit the scope of, or avoid, this 
obligation under certain circumstances.110  Pursuant to Article 37(a) of the Constitution, all 
land rights emanate from the sovereign—the state.111  The provision explicitly states that the 
union “is the ultimate owner of all lands and all natural resources above and below the 
ground, above and beneath the water and in the atmosphere.”112  
	
The first reference to individual property rights then appears in Article 37(c). That provision 
places an obligation on the government to afford property rights to occupants—“the union 
shall permit citizens113 right of private property, right of inheritance . . . in accord with 
the law.”114   This latter provision leaves the government free to set the scope of what 
constitutes the property rights it is obligated to permit. In an oft-cited report, the Asian 
Human Rights Commission has interpreted the legal regime set up by Article 37(a) and (c) 
as “enabling the state to take over any land on the pretext of embarking upon a project in the 
national interest.”115 
	
The government’s substantive obligations regarding property rights in the 2008 Constitution 
are similarly phrased. Article 372, discussing the right to private property, states that, “the 
Union guarantees the right to ownership, the use of property and the right to private 
invention and patent in the conducting of business if it is not contrary to the provisions of 
this Constitution and the existing laws.”116 Perhaps most importantly, the vesting of land 
“ownership” in the government under another constitutional provision, namely Article 37, 
presumably creates such “contrary law.” This in turn limits Article 372’s scope vis-à-vis land 
to “land-use” rather than ownership rights. 
 
In addition, pursuant to Article 356, “[t]he Union shall protect according to law movable and 
immovable properties of every citizen that are lawfully acquired.”117 This language raises 
several issues pertaining to land restitution. Most importantly, although only a few land laws 
are relied on in practice, many anachronistic land use statutes continue to exist in the books 
as good law. Some set conflicting standards of conduct specifically as to the question of legal 
acquisition.118  In addition, over the previous decades, when the sale of land was made 
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explicitly illegal, large numbers of individuals sold and purchased land informally, in what 
is known as “10-Kyat contract.”119 It is unclear whether constitutional protections apply to 
these lands, as they were not lawfully acquired. Also absent from mention are customary 
property regimes. 120  It is likewise uncertain whether these lands are constitutionally 
protected. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that none of the land-governance 
statutes passed after the constitution’s adoption explicitly protect, or have been interpreted 
to protect, informal or customary land regimes.121 
	
2) Legislative Protections   
 
In addition to the 2008 Constitution, the government passed two  implementing statutes that 
pertain to land rights – The Farmland Law 2012122 and The Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands 
Management Law 2012.123 Neither statute specifically applies to the land restitution rights 
of IDPs. In several places, these statutes create potential challenges to future land restitution 
efforts. 
 
A. The Farmland Law 
 
The 2012 Farmland Law creates several rights and protections that, in line with Article 37 
of the Constitution, are framed as “use” rather than ownership rights. The most important 
of these rights are the right to sell, buy and lease one’s land.124 The statute also protects the 
right to mortgage and inherit the land.125  To these ends, the statute expressly repeals the 
Land Nationalization Act of 1953,126 which directed all lands to become government property 
and made it illegal for farmers to transfer, exchange or lease their land. The Farmland Law 
also creates a comprehensive compensation mechanism should the government exercise its 
eminent domain power to seize the land for public use.127  
 
However, the Farmland Law also creates several sources of confusion that could adversely 
impact future restitution efforts. Most significantly, the statute makes no mention of IDPs 
nor does it clearly apply to customary farming methods.128 Similarly ambiguous is whether 
the Law’s compensation mechanism retroactively applies to land grabs that occurred prior to 
2012.129 Moreover, the statute overlaps with existing statutes that remain good law.130 For 
example, chapter 8 of the Farmland Law lays out relatively comprehensive compensation 
guidelines, while, the 1894 Land Acquisition Act, still on the books, also sets out (a less 
comprehensive) compensation mechanism.131 
 
B. The 2012 Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law (VFVL) 
 
The VFVL seeks to regulate and distribute unoccupied land towards more efficient purposes. 
In order to do so, the statute creates a “Central Committee” to administer all “vacant, fallow 
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and virgin lands.132 Pursuant to Chapter III, Section 8, the Central Committee has discretion 
to permit or deny the right to use the virgin, fallow or vacant land.133   
 
However, like the Farmland Law, the VFVL also creates potential hurdles for future land 
restitution efforts. First, unoccupied land is very broadly defined. The Act pertains to (a) 
“virgin” land, or “wild land and wild forest land . . . said expression shall include the lands of 
forest reserve, grazing ground and fishery”;134 and (b) “vacant” land, or abandoned land that 
was formerly tilled or used for breeding.135 Some scholars and commentators have suggested 
this definition of “virgin” and “fallow” land encompasses uplands, waterways, graze lands 
and lands on which farmers practice shifting cultivation; in other words, land managed under 
customary land tenure.136 Some of these lands are also located in resource-rich areas that are 
of particular interest to foreign and domestic investors.137 Therefore, it is possible that the 
VFVL could potentially further complicate Myanmar’s ongoing land disputes.  
 
In addition, under the VFVL, land that goes unused for four years reverts to government 
ownership as vacant or fallow land.138 This stands as a significant barrier to displaced 
persons who have been living in refugee camps for more than four years.   
	
C. Previous Legislative Attempts at Addressing Land Restitution 
There have been limited attempts at addressing land restitution in Myanmar. The most 
prominent example of this is the Reinvestigation Committee for Confiscated Farmlands and 
Other Lands, created by the federal government in 2016.139 Experts on land restitution see 
the Reinvestigation Committee as not adequately addressing the crisis of land tenure caused 
by land confiscation and displaced persons in the country.140  The Reinvestigation Committee 
faced a backlog of thousands of cases, political pressure, and a narrow mandate—it 
considered cases of illegally confiscated land but did not address the land disputes facing 
displaced persons.141 
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PART V: COMPARATIVE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES  
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
 
Various countries have faced similar challenges as Myanmar and, consequently, have 
implemented land restitution efforts. These comparative country case studies, along with the 
international and domestic legal context, can provide a framework for understanding what 
should be included in a potential land restitution and land reform efforts in Myanmar. For 
this part of the report, we surveyed the land restitution and land reform programs of various 
countries and identified five countries that contain socio-cultural elements relevant to 
Myanmar’s context: post-conflict nations, some of which are also post-colonial, that have 
undergone land policy reform with similar conditions to Myanmar such as the presence of 
IDPs and multiple ethnic communities. For each case study—Bosnia and Herzegovina, East 
Timor, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, and Zimbabwe—we used the Pinheiro Principles and 
international standards as guidance and have noted particular lessons learned that may be 
relevant to Myanmar. Uganda and Sri Lanka were in the original set of countries reviewed 
but were omitted after a determination that they ultimately did not offer significant lessons 
for Myanmar. 
	
2) ASSESSMENT TOOLS FOR COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
 
A. The Pinheiro Principles  
 
Spurred by the global spike in internal population displacement during and following the 
civil wars of the 1990’s, the UN community began formulating coherent, unified global 
standards on restitution rights142 for refugees and IDPs that embodies international human 
rights standards, as well as lessons learned.143 The resulting United Nations Principles on 
Housing and Restitution for Refugees and Displace Persons (Pinheiro Principles) are relied 
on throughout this section as the standard against which to assess the performance of each 
country case study’s restitution program.    
  
The Pinheiro Principles were developed by the Special Rapporteur on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, and 
approved by the UN Human Rights Sub-Committee in 2005.144 The principles reflect both the 
international community’s human rights standard vis-à-vis land restitution discussed above, 
as well as best practices learned from national and international efforts to address post-
conflict displacement. Plainly stated, the principles are “designed to provide a universal 
approach to dealing effectively with outstanding housing and property restitution claims.”145  
Moreover, the Pinheiro Principles are drafted to apply to all those forced to leave their 
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property involuntarily, regardless of the particular form of displacement (Pinheiro Principle 
1) and are therefore equally applicable to all IDPs.  
  
Pinheiro Principle 2 defines and reaffirms the right of all displaced persons to housing and 
restitution adopted in earlier U.N decisions discussed above.146 The document formulates 
restitution as the “right to have their land and/or home returned to them,” or alternatively, 
“be compensated in cases where restoration is factually impossible. ”147 Crucially, factual 
impossibility is to be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal148 – the very kind 
of institution that often is lacking in post-conflict environments.  
  
Sections 3-10 seek to ensure that the restitution program’s implementation are guided and 
informed by other crucial human rights. These include, among others, the right to non-
discrimination, gender equality, peaceful enjoyment of possessions and freedom of 
movement.149 The “right to return”, voluntarily, to one’s land is required by Section 10. 
Return must be voluntary, including for IDPs not coerced.  
  
Sections 11-22 provide for very specific procedures and standards that states designing post-
conflict land restitution programs should implement. These sections can in turn be used to 
construct a metric to assess the performance of a country’s land restitution program.   
  
For the purposes of this study, the substantive provisions of the Pinheiro Principles (listed in 
short form in the following chart) have been synthesized into quantitative and qualitative 
factors that measure the performance of each studied country’s land redistribution and 
restoration program. These factors are considered throughout this section. For ease of 
reference, we provide a summary chart listing these factors, as well as each studied country’s 
performance vis-à-vis these factors. See Appendix: Summary Chart. 150 
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1. Scope and 
Application
2. The right to 
housing and 
property 
restitution
3. The right to non-
discrimination
4. The right to 
equality between 
men and women 
5. The right to be 
protected from 
displacement
6. The right to 
privacy and respect 
for the home
7. The right to 
peaceful 
enjoyment of 
possessions
8. The right to 
adequate housing
9. The right to 
freedom of 
movement
10. The right to 
voluntary return in 
safety and dignity
11. Compatibility 
with international 
human rights and 
related standards
12. National 
procedures, 
institutions and 
mechanisms
13. Accessibility of 
restitution claims 
procedures
14. Adequate 
consultation and 
participation in 
decision-making
15. Housing, land 
and property 
records and 
documentation
16. The rights of 
tentants and other 
non-owners
17. Secondary 
occupants
18. Legislative 
measures
19. Prohibition of 
arbitrary and 
discriminatory laws
20. Enforcement of 
restitution 
decisions and 
judgments
21. Compensation
22. Responsibility 
of  the 
international 
community
23. Interpretation
Pinheiro Principles 
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B. Alternative Principles: The Voluntary Guidelines  
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization has also published Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National 
Food Security (“Voluntary Guidelines”).151 The Voluntary Guidelines offer a separate set of 
guiding principles for land restitution and land reform, with significant detail added to flesh 
out its broad principles, including sections devoted to the legal recognition and allocation of 
tenure rights, transfers, and administration.152 The Voluntary Guidelines are likely to prove 
informative for any country undergoing land restitution and land reform, including 
Myanmar, and are respected and followed by many members of civil society.  
 
Researchers ultimately chose to frame the analysis in this Report using the Pinheiro 
Principles because they are the formal guidance from the UN and leading scholars153 in the 
field of land restitution and land reform have relied on the Pinheiro Principles. Because the 
Voluntary Guidelines generally align with the Pinheiro Principles and do not provide 
conflicting guidance, both sources provide valid frameworks for analysis.  
 
3) CASE STUDY 1: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 
A. Background 
 
As with the other states that comprised the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
(“BiH”) experience with land restitution and land reform has been complex, defined by ethnic 
conflict, political instability, and the move from a centrally-planned socialist economy to a 
market one.154 Unlike most states of the former Yugoslavia, BiH is composed of three major 
ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs), none of whom represent a significant majority. 
This dynamic defined the state’s experience with independence and related land restitution 
and land reform.155  
 
BiH was a part of the Ottoman Empire and then the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy until 
World War I. During the Ottoman era, property in BiH was largely organized through timar 
and zaim, feudal estates determined by military service.156 This same system was kept by the 
Austro-Hungarian regime, which also instituted a dual land registration system that 
continues to this day. Under this system, local courts kept a land register and the 
municipalities ran the “cadastre.”157 Between the world wars, BiH became a part of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During this time, land was redistributed from primarily wealthy 
Muslim landowners to poor Serbian peasants, dissolving the share tenancy systems.158 The 
Nazis treated	BiH as a spoil of war during World War II, displacing Jews and Muslims from 
land and awarding it to Slovene “colonists.”159 	
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Following the war, BiH became a Socialist Republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Significant amounts of agricultural and industrial land as well as commercial 
property, such as urban apartment buildings, were confiscated by the state during these 
years, and either distributed to peasants or kept in state ownership, with individuals granted 
occupancy rights.160 
 
BiH declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, after a referendum that was boycotted 
by Serbs living in BiH. This declaration led to violent ethnic conflict that lasted for three 
years, at which point BiH was declared an independent country. Over a million residents 
were displaced during the conflict, and half of the state’s housing units destroyed.161 After 
the conflict ended, the international entity of the High Representative (OHR) 162 helped 
facilitate a peace, which had as one of its focuses property restitution and population 
return.163  
 
The international community and the OHR continue to be invested in BiH to this day. The 
country still faces social turmoil and has been referred to as a “‘neo-feudal’ state in which 
power is concentrated locally, in mini-states, based on patronage, influence peddling, and 
mafia-like elites.”164 
 
B. Property Rights and Claims  
 
There were several different groups with property rights and claims that had to be considered 
when BiH and the HR began peacebuilding efforts in 1995. The primary groups were 
composed of the following: individuals who had their property socialized under the Yugoslav 
regime; individuals who had abandoned their property during the 1990s conflict; and 
individuals who had been awarded abandoned property during the 1990s conflict. 
 
Individuals who had their property socialized under Yugoslavia included members of all 
ethnic groups. The poor land recording system and the destruction of government property 
during the 1990s conflict made these claims particularly hard to prove.  
 
Individuals who had abandoned their property during the 1990s conflict constituted over one 
million Bosnian citizens who had often left their homes suddenly and had been forced by 
armed combatants to sign papers signifying “abandonment” of their property.165 
	
Individuals who had been awarded abandoned property during the 1990s conflict had 
generally been reallocated “abandoned” property by one of the warring ethnic groups during 
the conflict. The warring groups meant to consolidate ethnic control over areas through such 
allocations, though they provided the housing for allegedly “humanitarian reasons” to people 
who had fled other areas of the country.166 
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C. Policy and Legal Responses  
 
BiH and the HR adopted several policy responses in its efforts at land restitution and land 
reform after the 1990s conflict. A notable omission, though, is that the state did not address 
those who lost their property to socialization under Yugoslavia. These people were not eligible 
for compensation or restitution of any kind.167 Overall, the system was created to return to 
the pre-conflict status quo. But not to create a durable, consistent property system.  
 
The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), for the first time in such an 
international agreement, included the “right to return home,” and to be compensated if a 
home had been destroyed.168  These rights were grounded in the international rights of 
refugees and IDPs to return. Because of the reallocation policies during the war, the parties 
also adopted the condition of reciprocity. Since all three ethnic factions had given 
“abandoned” property to displaced people of their own ethnicity, the post-war policy of 
property repossession allowed displaced individuals to remain in their wartime property 
until they were able to return to their pre-war property, or they had been compensated for it. 
This included property that was socially owned.169 Driven by international pressure, the 
territories controlled by all three ethnic groups also ended the discriminatory policies and 
laws concerning abandoned properties with the “laws on cessation.”170 
 
The international community supported robust international monitors, including the United 
Nation’s Property Law Implementation Plan (UN PLIP), which assisted in full 
implementation of these policies. 171  PLIP was led by the UN’s High Commissioner for 
Refugees, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the UN Mission in 
Bosnia Herzegovina, which worked together in an attempt to create a consistent approach 
towards political questions over property in BiH. These groups supported local groups in BiH 
to coordinate the property mandates of the overlapping agencies and primarily worked on 
ensuring that refugees returned home, that property policies were applied across BiH in a 
neutral manner, and that BiH began to adopt a consistent property law scheme.172 
 
The OHR also set up a dispute resolution body under Annex 7 of the peace agreement, the 
Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC), which 
handled disputed property claims, for both residential and non-residential property. At first, 
the CRPC had no enforcement power, and was ad hoc, decentralized, and met with 
obstruction by local officials.173 Its decisions were made final and binding, though, and it 
ended up processing 310,000 claims in a neutral manner that has been highly praised.174 
	
The CRPC’s primary mandate was to make final decisions on the property rights and values. 
It was run by nine commissioners, three of whom were international and six of whom were 
national (two each of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks), and supported by the International 
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Organisation for Migration.175 Staff included international and local lawyers, as well as other 
experts with property expertise. The staff was intentionally ethnically diverse. The CRPC set 
up six regional offices and eventually ran twenty-two claims collection facilities.  
 
The CRPC was given broad powers in order to fulfill its mandate, including accessing all 
property records in BiH, sending staff to investigate and process claims, adopting its own 
procedural and substantive rules, and disregarding all illegal property transactions 
(particularly those made under duress). It rendered final decisions that took priority over any 
inconsistent decisions by other bodies (such as local courts) or documents (such as deeds).176 
The CRPC was able to award either possession or compensation (as discussed below, it 
generally awarded possession).177 The process it set up allowed claimants to choose their 
preferred course for using their property. However, the CRPC was a purely administrative 
body and did not implement its own decisions, but rather the implementation was handled 
by other domestic agencies, which were often obstructionist, particularly at the start of the 
process until cooperation increased under international pressure.178 By 1999, local courts 
generally respected the binding force of CRPC decisions when claimants had trouble 
repossessing their properties and the current inhabitants of property could be forcibly ejected 
if they did not follow court orders.179 By 2004, 90% of displaced claimants had recovered 
binding rights on their pre-conflict properties, though not all had been able to repossess their 
properties (often due to the destruction of homes, security concerns, or difficulty traveling).180 
The success of the compensation side of the CRPC was never truly tested because of the 
preference for restoration, but the proposed Compensation Fund, intended to be funded by 
donors, did not materialize; the Fund was not self-sustaining and BiH was facing budgetary 
shortfalls, which likely means the compensation mechanism would have faced significant 
barriers if it had been employed.181 
 
Complex special procedures were set up to deal with the possibility of fraudulent claims and 
the extra difficulties that came with working with displaced persons who were often poor and 
illiterate.182 It also took three years for the CRPC staff to build a “cadastral database” which 
had “the most comprehensive and technologically advanced” database of property 
information in the region to facilitate solving property claims.183  
	
Eventually, the CRPC was generally considered a success. As stated above, by 2004, it 
provided 90% of claimants displaced by the conflict binding rights on their pre-conflict 
properties. Over two million people were displaced, internally or abroad as refugees, by the 
conflict; by 1999, the CRPC had processed 200,000 claims and released 80,000 decisions and, 
by 2003, over one million displaced persons had returned to their pre-conflict homes.184 The 
precise number of those who returned is difficult to determine because many people created 
lasting homes during the war and many displaced persons who returned home were also 
occupying abandoned properties in other regions during the war.185 Those who occupied 
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abandoned properties during the war almost always had their interests subordinated to the 
pre-war occupants, although if they themselves had been displaced, they were eligible for 
emergency housing.186 Because the CRPC was focused on the claims of those displaced by the 
1990s conflict, its mandate did not encompass and did not assist those individuals displaced 
by the Yugoslav socialist regime.  
 
D. Lessons Learned  
 
The BiH post-conflict restitution approach has generally been praised as successful given its 
relatively narrow focus.187 The primary flaw was that there was no restitution (restoration or 
compensation) for property owners whose land had been socialized under the Yugoslav 
regime. There were specific problems with the implementation as well. Military officials from 
the Yugoslav People’s Army, for example, often had their property rights in socially owned 
apartments revoked if they failed to meet strict criteria under the federal “Apartments Law,” 
since they were not considered refugees under that law. This law was eventually amended 
following criticism and decisions before the European Court of Human Rights and other legal 
bodies but the CRPC never required the government amend it. This was criticized as 
collective punishment for the aggressors.188 
	
The BiH land restitution and land reform process was the first one in the former Yugoslavia 
and it helped provide a framework for future land efforts in the region. Its focus, which was 
followed in Kosovo (see Part V.7), was on returning property rights to the pre-war status quo. 
This included returning property to those who had lived there without proper title and 
allowing title disputes that existed pre-war to be solved by the courts at a later date.189  
 
One important lesson from BiH is the necessity of incorporating regional historical practices 
into property schemes. In BiH, this meant understanding the role of socially owned property 
and occupancy rights as well as how to handle restitution for the secondary residents of 
property (those who took occupancy as displaced persons during the war). The process also 
showed the international community that property rights should be respected as their own 
right, not just as a means to accomplish the right to return home. Finally, the BiH experience 
showed the potential for local officials’ obstruction and the need for a formal mechanism to 
handle disputes that could not be undermined by such officials.190 
 
4) CASE STUDY 2: EAST TIMOR  
 
A. Background  
  
East Timor’s land tenure problems stem from its complicated political history. Since first 
being discovered by Portuguese explorers in the 1500s, it was first a Portuguese colony and 
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then later, an Indonesian province. In 1974, the Portuguese dictatorship ended and the 
process of decolonization began. East Timor unilaterally declared independence on the 28th 
of November, 1975. 
 
That year Indonesia invaded East Timor and, over the next two decades, engaged in 
aggressive acts, killings and disappearances in East Timor. At the time, Indonesia occupied 
West Timor, and fearing that an independent East Timor would threaten Indonesia’s 
security, decided to heavily support people willing to integrate with Indonesia. A civil war 
ensued between parties in favor of independence for East Timor and those in favor of 
integration with Indonesia. Indonesian troops invaded East Timor and declared it to be a 
province. However, the East Timorese were dissatisfied with Indonesian rule, and voted in a 
1999 referendum in favor of independence. The Indonesian military was angered by the 
outcome of this vote and violently retaliated against the East Timorese.  
 
East Timor was declared an independent nation in 2002, but the country was left with 
numerous challenges in the aftermath of the Indonesian military violence post-referendum. 
From 1999-2002, East Timor was administrated by the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET was established on 25 October 1999 to 
administer the territory, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition 
period and support the building of self-government. East Timor gained its independence as a 
country on 20 May 2002. Many of the country’s land records were destroyed in the period of 
violence preceding UNTAET’s administration; the Indonesian military had purposely torched 
buildings and land titles. It is estimated that eighty percent of Indonesian land records in 
East Timor were destroyed.191 Given that East Timor was first a Portuguese territory and 
then an Indonesian one, this alone would have created a number of conflicting land title 
issues. However, in addition, the violence of the Indonesian military resulted in a country 
with housing shortages and considerable difficulty in ascertaining ownership of land.  
 
East Timor is therefore both a post-conflict and a post-colonial environment.192 As such, it 
faces post-conflict issues such as the return of refugees, inadequate shelter, restoration of 
land records, and restoration of institutions of governance.193 In terms of post-colonial issues, 
East Timor has had to implement a new government, build new infrastructure, employ a 
method with which to resolve land conflicts and develop a land tenure system that can 
address the injustices of colonial and invasion rule.194  
 
B. Property Rights and Claims  
 
Post-referendum, East Timor saw an abundance of land claims based on claims from various 
times throughout the country’s history. There are four categories of potential claimants of 
land in East Timor. Claimants can be customary owners of the land, individuals who acquired 
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land under Portuguese title, individuals who acquired land under Indonesian title, and 
individuals in current possession of the land.195  
 
Traditional occupiers of land include those who hold customary rights to land. Given that 
customary land is not recognized in the legal system, most land in the rural areas of East 
Timor is not recognized in any formal system; the land is distributed in accordance with 
traditional institutions and is normally held in community-based groups.    
 
Individuals who acquired land under Portuguese rule include the people who acquired title 
to land during East Timor’s time as a Portuguese colony. The claims made by these people 
have involved titles for very valuable land, and concerns were raised that recognizing these 
claims would result in a small colonial elite holding some large and valuable parcels of land 
in East Timor.196 Recognition of these titles was found to be justified under the law of 
“belligerent occupation” which would conclude that since Indonesia was a belligerent 
occupier, Portuguese law remained, in effect, the underlying law of East Timor during the 
period of Indonesia’s occupation.197 Thus, since the land titles issued under Portuguese rule 
should have been recognized during Indonesia’s occupation, they should still be recognized 
today.  
 
Individuals who acquired land under Indonesian rule were overwhelmingly wealthy 
Indonesian families and corporations. Few East Timorese acquired these titles. Some 
suggested that the belligerent occupation rule applied and so invalidated the recognition of 
any Indonesian titles. However, others argued that the East Timorese who did acquire land 
under Indonesian rule did so in good faith. In addition, finding the titles acquired under 
Indonesian rule invalid would have likely conflicted with international standards relating to 
housing security and protection against unreasonable evictions.198 Finally, it was not clear 
that the Constitution terminated past rights of non-nationals or that, even if it did, it 
terminated land use rights rather than simply ownership rights.       
 
Individuals who are currently occupying land were the final group of land claimants. Due to 
political unrest over the past 40 years, there are high levels of displaced groups in East Timor. 
Many properties are occupied by people who are not recorded owners. Moreover, at issue were 
not only claims by original owners of land, but also claims of people who entered into land 
contracts with people who were not the rightful owners of the land.199   
 
C. Policy and Legal Responses  
 
To resolve these various arguably legitimate competing claims, a mediation model for 
addressing conflicts over land was introduced in East Timor by the UN Transitional 
Administration in 2000.200 Mediation takes place both through this formal structure and 
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through ad hoc channels. East Timor’s National Directorate of Land and Property helps with 
mediation, but the mediation itself can follow many paths. The system involves interim no-
violence agreements that may be sealed by ritual and witnessed by traditional, government, 
and church representatives. A benefit of this program is that it embeds the mediation system 
in land administration rather than judicial administration which allows for remedies to be 
reached that are unavailable to the courts, such as selling, leasing, dividing, or swapping 
land.201 It also creates a bridge between traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms and the 
courts; this is advantageous because when parties agree, they may use ritual and customary 
institutions, and when they are unable to agree, they may resort to the court system.202 
However, mediation will not occur if the land subject to dispute is the property of the state 
or if one of the parties is an officer of government.203  
 
The mediation process is as follows:204  
 
1. A claimant goes to the National Land and Property Directorate or the District 
Land and Property Directorate office and requests mediation. A dispute may also 
be referred to the directorate by a village head if the parties agree to this. 
2. The other parties to the dispute are informed of the claim. Mediation proceeds only 
when all the parties to the dispute voluntarily accept the mediation.  
3. The parties to the dispute agree to a Land and Property Directorate mediator. 
4. A directorate mediator visits the disputed land and gathers information about the 
history of ownership from local informants.  
5. The directorate mediator invites the claimant and current occupant to separate 
meetings to hear each side of the dispute. Evidence may be presented that includes 
public and private documents, witnesses, and physical proof.  
6. The directorate mediator then meets with the claimant and the current occupant 
together in order to try and find a solution that is acceptable to both parties.  
7. During these meetings, the directorate mediator may facilitate interim 
agreements relating to land use and commitments not to engage in violence during 
pending resolution of the conflict. The mediator may also suggest possible 
solutions to the conflict, such as dividing, selling, leasing, or swapping the land.  
8. The matter will be resolved if a solution agreeable to both parties is reached. If the 
parties fail to reach an agreement after three joint meetings, the dispute is 
referred to the courts.  
9. If a settlement is reached, a report is produced and signed by both parties and the 
directorate mediator. The settlement is then registered with the Land and 
Property Directorate.  
 
Mediation of land conflicts by the Land and Property Directorate has been more successful 
than resolution through the courts. In particular, East Timorese prefer to resolve disputes at 
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the local and customary level and this system allows them to do this. Using local mechanisms 
for dispute resolution is cheaper, faster, and more accessible. Between May 2002 to June 
2007, out of 747 disputes brought to the Land and Property Directorate, 240 were marked as 
resolved.  
 
In 2009, the Minister of Justice produced the “Draft Law on the Special Regime for 
Attributing Property Rights” but it has not yet been approved by the government. It was 
vetoed by the president in 2012 because traditional tenure was insufficiently protected and 
the law made no explicit recognition of customary forms of tenure. As of 2002, East Timor 
did not have a functioning land registry, an effective regime to govern and legalize foreign 
interests in land or a framework to determine competing claims to land.205   
 
D. Lessons Learned  
 
Several lessons can be derived from East Timor’s post-conflict land situation. First, where 
there is destruction of property, records, housing, and infrastructure, it is imperative that 
interim measures be taken to ameliorate land administration problems caused by the process 
of refugee return. One such measure is to divert returnees (refugees and IDPs), particularly 
those that lack housing of their own, to temporary transit housing centers.206 This results in 
a minimization of rushing to occupy habitable homes and aids in the long-term process of re-
establishing land administration. This kind of interim land administration helps to manage 
the process of return and reconstruction without the necessity of final determination of 
underlying ownership, which requires more time, building, and infrastructure. Second, the 
establishment of a land claims commission in East Timor was postponed and interim 
solutions provided some mechanism to regulate private transactions of land.207 In addition, 
de facto situations start to consolidate more and more with time. As it becomes more difficult 
to return land already filled with current occupants. 
 
The development of a system that enhances certainty in post-conflict land administration 
without necessarily resolving the underlying issue of land ownership can be successful if it is 
focused on transactions rather than title.208 Such a system can provide incentives for those 
taking private interests in land to register their transactions and it includes the potential for 
this registration to provide more certainty of title as time goes on. 
	
5) CASE STUDY 3: INDONESIA 
 
A. Background 
 
Before its independence in 1945, Indonesia was always under some form of colonial rule. Its 
land situation is informed by this; the land laws that evolved were a mixture of western 
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systems (to satisfy the interests of the colonial governments) and the traditional unwritten 
laws based on customary rights to land which existed in Indonesian cultural groups.209 
Indonesia sought to end this dualism in land law through the passage of the Basic Agrarian 
Law.  
 
B. Property Rights and Claims  
 
An increased focus on rapid economic development in Indonesia from the 1960s to the 1990s 
left certain segments of the population neglected; in particular, rural landlessness is a 
significant problem, especially on Java.210 Generally, land rights of unregistered land owners 
are insecure, which greatly affects traditional communities. Many traditional communities 
live in forest areas with land owned through customary tenure; Indonesia’s significant 
deforestation comes with an increasing high cost to traditional communities who rely on the 
forests for their livelihood. Since their land rights are not formally recorded, they historically 
have been unrecognized by the state. Uncertainties over policy and regulatory practices, as 
well as overlapping land-use and property rights in general, have created frictions between 
the central and local governments and between businesses (mostly the mining and palm oil 
sectors) and local communities.211 
 
Indonesia’s 1999 Forestry Law effectively allowed the government to convert customary 
forests into state forests and, once under state jurisdiction, these forests could be converted 
into private concessions. Thirty percent of Indonesia’s lands had been given to private 
companies as concessions, and many of these territories overlapped with indigenous lands.212  
 
Most land claims in Indonesia come from a desire from indigenous peoples to assert or 
strengthen their land rights over forest lands. 
 
C. Policy and Legal Responses  
 
Indonesia’s land rights are primarily governed by the Basic Agrarian Law, Law No. 5 of 1960 
(the “BAL”). This land policy pertains to 30% of Indonesia’s land; the other 70% was classified 
as state forest land under the Basic Forestry Act of 1967.213 This 70% of Indonesian land is 
not subject to agrarian law and makes the state and its forestry institutions the single largest 
landlord in the country. Declaring 70% of Indonesia as forest land and state-owned resulted 
in dispossession and a multitude of land grabbing by the military, enterprises, and state 
institutions.214 The BAL defines the fundamental types of rights that may be held by private 
individuals and entities and it describes the role of the state with regard to its regulation of 
private rights and private uses of land. 215  It states that Indonesia’s agrarian law is 
Indonesian customary law as long as it does not conflict with other regulations or national 
interests. 
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There are currently five types of basic tenure, with the highest and closest to freehold tenure 
called Hak Milik, this tenure is the same as ownership. Hak Guna Usaha is cultivation only; 
Hak Guna Bangunan is building only; Hak Pakai is use only; and Hak Pengenolaan is land 
management only.216 
 
Customary land law (adat) governs Indonesia’s traditional communal land tenure system. 
Article 5 of the BAL states that Indonesia’s agrarian law is adat law, but it also considers 
these customary laws to be incompatible with economic development and expects adat to 
gradually adapt to national law or be replaced by it.217 The government has been hostile for 
a few decades to the continued existence of communal tenure.218 
 
The institutional land governance framework appears to be decentralized. Given that there 
are inefficiencies across agencies with large overlap in mandate, the administration of 
governance and application of policies have been inconsistent and discretion abused.219 In 
1999, the formerly centralized system was decentralized and large powers were given to the 
regional governments. There is currently a mix that resembles a top down system with 
regards to development, with regional governments making plans but the central 
government having the authority to override locally-made plans.220 
 
Indonesia commenced a Land Administration Project (LAP I) in 1994. The project aimed to 
accelerate land titling and registration by systematically mapping and registering rights for 
land for parcels in all non-forest areas; to strengthen the National Land Agency as an 
institution so that it can achieve the objectives of the program; and to support the government 
of Indonesia’s efforts to come up with a long term policy for land management through a 
series of studies.221 The Land Management and Policy Development Project (LMPDP) was 
intended to follow LAP I but focus more on institutional development.  
 
There are multiple land rights issues that must be addressed in legislation going forward. 
The existence of both formal and customary law leads to ambiguity in interpretation and 
often leads to the undermining of land rights and increased disputes and conflict over land. 
The land registration system that Indonesia does have is overly complex, creating 
inefficiencies that weaken security of tenure and the development of a functioning land 
market.222 Another problem is that a focus on economic development has led to deforestation 
that significantly threatens Indonesia’s forest resources, to the point of impacting global 
climate change. Finally, rural landlessness has led to livelihood and food insecurities for 
millions of families. 
 
There has been an increasing focus on protection of community rights and that of indigenous 
persons. In March of 2017, the World Bank approved a $6.25 million grant to help Indonesia’s 
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indigenous and local communities secure land rights, manage forests, and improve their 
livelihoods. Given that forestry is an important source of income for many of Indonesia’s rural 
communities, the grant will help address deforestation and strengthening of indigenous 
peoples’ rights. President Joko Widodo announced in 2017 that Indonesia would return 
13,000 hectares of customary lands to nine indigenous communities and committed to 
returning 12.7 million hectares to local and indigenous groups.223 Indonesia’s decision to 
return customary lands to indigenous peoples was considered a landmark achievement.  
 
D. Lessons Learned  
 
Indonesia provides important lessons for land disputes that stem from the government’s 
taking of customary lands.   In the case of Indonesia, an overly cumbersome land registration 
system may not be an improvement on  lack of  registration altogether. The financial burdens 
associated with registering land in Indonesia served as a barrier to doing so. In addition, the 
complex system lead to ambiguities and a lack of clear rights and procedures for registering 
communal rights. Since customary practices differ across communities in separate districts, 
this central registration system is unproductive. A better administration solution would 
involve working with districts to understand processes for identifying, describing, and 
registering customary land rights of traditional communities. Districts would also be able to 
develop local guidelines for implementing more transparent procedures.  
 
One more lesson is that legislation that resolves ambiguities between customary and formal 
land laws may be necessary to effective land restitution. If legislation can clarify the 
differences between the two and provide a mechanism for translating one into the other, this 
might reduce confusion and conflict between the co-existing customary and formal systems. 
 
6) CASE STUDY 4: IRAQ 
 
A. Background 
 
Iraq is composed of three primary ethnic groups—Shia Arabs (the majority), Sunni Arabs, 
and Iraqi Kurds—as well as a number of smaller minority groups, such as the Christian 
Yazidis, Assyrians, and Turkmen. The Shia majority and Kurds were “viciously suppressed” 
for much of the latter half of the twentieth century, under the Ba’ath regime.224 The 2005 
Constitution recognizes the autonomy of the Kurdish region, Kurdistan, in northern Iraq.225 
 
Iraq was a part of the Ottoman Empire until World War I, after which it came under British 
control. During the Ottoman era, property was classified under the quasi-feudal TAPU 
system which issued title deeds and ran a land registry. Individual property rights were 
recognized.226 In 1932, Iraq gained independence and became the Kingdom of Iraq, under the 
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control of a Hashemite monarch. This king was overthrown in 1958, and the Republic of Iraq 
took place of the Kingdom. Two successive coups in 1963 overthrew the government and the 
Ba’ath Party (which had been behind the first of the 1963 coups) attempted another coup in 
1968, through which it succeeded in taking control of the government. There were some 
reforms to land ownership during this time, but the Ba’ath government largely inherited the 
TAPU system.227 
 
Iraq was controlled by the Ba’ath regime from 1968 to 2003, with Saddam Hussein at the 
helm from 1979 until his overthrow during the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States-
led coalition. Hussein led a secular Sunni Arab government that oppressed the Shia majority 
and other ethnic minority groups. Individual and new group rights for property were 
recognized during the Ba’athist regime; communal ownership was encouraged during the 
early socialist years; and the TAPU system was replaced with the Real Estate Registration 
Law. 228  This Law improved the issuance of titles and created Real Estate Registration 
Departments throughout the country. This system continues today and most land is 
registered under it (about 96%).229  
 
During the Ba’athist regime, many non-Sunni Iraqis were denied their property rights for 
ethnic, religious, and political reasons. 230  The government frequently engaged in forced 
displacement and property expropriation or destruction policies to consolidate its power.231 
These policies targeted political enemies as well as Shia Arabs and ethnic/religious minorities 
(Assyrians, Turkmen, and Yazidis). Several specific policies undertaken by the regime were 
“Arabisation policies” that displaced non-Arabs in the north (e.g. Kirkuk) with Sunni Arabs 
from the south; the Al-Anfal campaign and other politically motivated punishment for 
opposition to the regime (specifically Kurds); the expulsion of “disloyal” Shias of Iranian 
origin during the 1980s; and the “crony capitalism” policies that allowed Ba’athist allies to 
take land they desired.232 These policies displaced about one million Iraqis.233 
 
After the 2003 invasion, the United States-led coalition retained a significant presence in 
Iraq over the next decade. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ran Iraq under military 
occupation immediately following the occupation but it quickly ceded some power to the Iraq 
Interim Governing Council and then to the Iraqi Interim Government, a caretaker 
government. Elections in 2005 (the first in fifty years and boycotted by Sunni Arabs) led to a 
transitional government and then a series of uneasy, elected governments. Many Sunni 
Arabs who had been moved to northern Iraq during the “Arabisation” policies were forcibly 
ejected from their residences following the 2003 invasion.234 “Bogus” titles to land increased 
during this time of instability.235  
 
Though there have been some periods of relative stability, Iraq has continued to face serious 
political instability, violence, regional turmoil, and terrorism, leading to significant civilian 
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deaths since the 2003 overthrow of Hussein.236 Al-Qaeda and, more recently, ISIS insurgents 
have posed a serious threat. ISIS has retained control of major Iraqi areas, including Fallujah 
and Mosul, since 2014, leading to airstrikes by the US and other foreign powers and the 
resignation of the government. Since the 2003 invasion, “land and property rights violations 
have persisted and periodically increased due to the mass displacement and political turmoil 
between 2006 and 2008 and again in early 2014.”237 About four million additional Iraqis were 
displaced from 2003 to 2008.238  
 
B. Property Rights and Claims  
 
There were several potential claimants of disputed land that were relevant to the land 
restitution and land reform efforts post-2003. The most relevant groups included individuals 
who had lost their property to discriminatory Ba’athist policies; individuals whose property 
had been destroyed during the Ba’athist regime; and individuals who were driven from their 
homes after the 2003 invasion. 
 
Individuals who had lost their property to discriminatory Ba’athist policies included those 
who were targeted by the Arabisation policies in the north and the crony capitalism 
supported by the Ba’athist regime. This group mainly comprised Shia Arabs and 
ethnic/religious minority groups.  
 
Individuals whose property had been destroyed during the Ba’athist regime, due to the Al-
Anfal or other campaigns, were often similar to those targeted by discriminatory policies. For 
example, farmers had their property taken under discriminatory policies and the property on 
these farms destroyed. Many of the victims of property destruction were ethnic minorities.  
 
Individuals who were driven from their homes after the 2003 invasion were often the Sunni 
Arabs who had been moved to the northern regions under the Arabisation policies. Many 
were poor and did not have anywhere to go after they were driven from the property after 
Hussein and the Ba’athist regime fell. 
 
 
C. Policy and Legal Responses  
 
Property disputes were a serious concern following the 2003 invasion. Especially in strategic 
areas such as Kirkuk and Kurdistan, there was a real concern that conflicting property claims 
would lead to increased instability across the country. Because most properties from which 
people had been displaced were at that point occupied by poor residents with nowhere else to 
go, the government faced a dilemma over how to address these disputes.239 While specific 
policies have changed, since 2003, the Iraqi government has encouraged refugees and 
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internally displaced persons to return to their homes, with public awareness campaigns and 
grants to aid resettlement.240 
 
To address conflicting and longstanding property claims in Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi 
government, at that point led by the coalition under the CPA, created the independent, quasi-
judicial Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes (CRRPD).241 The CRRPD 
was later renamed the Property Claims Commission (PCC). When the Iraqi interim 
government took over from the CPA, the commission generally kept the same mandate but 
with some changed policy approaches. Both the CRRPD and the PCC were at all times staffed 
entirely by Iraqi nationals, with international involvement mostly limited to the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) providing technical assistance.242 
 
The primary goal of the commission was to process, collect, and adjudicate property disputes 
stemming from the acts of the Ba’athist regime. The Iraqi government in control after the 
CPA ceded power strongly felt that those who had lost property rights under the Ba’aths 
deserved restitution. 243  As such, the commission only had jurisdiction over claims from 
between 1968 and 2003.244 The commission had mandates over “(1) confiscation or seizure of 
property for political, religious or ethnic reasons or in relation to ethnic, sectarian or 
nationalistic displacement; (2) appropriation or seizure of property without consideration, 
with manifest injustice or in violation of the applicable legal rules; and (3) state property 
allocated to the members of the previous regime without consideration.”245 These categories 
demonstrate that the group for which systematic redress was possible was those whose 
property had been forcibly taken by the Ba’aths and not those whose property was destroyed 
or who lost non-real estate property. Individuals who had long-standing leases that were not 
formally registered (a common practice) and farmers without formal documentation 
generally received no help from the commission.246 
 
The PCC set up thirty decentralized branches and thirty-five judicial committees to process 
and adjudicate property claims.247  The commissions allowed for both compensation and 
property restoration mechanisms. Victims had the right to property restoration where the 
property was in the hands of the government, a high-ranking Ba’ath member, or a person 
who had taken “advantage” of the victim; otherwise, the victim could request restoration or 
compensation. If granted restoration where the secondary occupant had bought the property 
in good faith, the secondary occupant could apply for compensation.248 Experts testified at 
hearings on the valuation of property, based on value at the time of the claim. The party that 
first sold the property after the victim lost it (generally the government) had to pay this 
compensation, though government payment was slow and hesitant.249 All parties had the 
right to appeal.  
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With the help of the IOM, the commission set up a web-based property claims system and an 
online database of property records. 250  The IOM also assisted the PCC with training, 
information dissemination, awareness, and out-of-country claims (needed due to the number 
of Iraqi citizens who fled Iraq during and after the Ba’athist regime).251 By 2005, about 
500,000 displaced persons had returned to their homes; by 2009, the PCC had received about 
150,000 claims; about 67,000 had been decided while compensation had been paid in only 
1,000.252 
 
Land restitution and land reform efforts have also been shaped by regional variation, 
especially in areas like Kurdistan where multiple governments vie for power and, therefore, 
have not been stable across Iraq. Land registration and dispute resolution is complicated in 
Kurdistan by the ongoing struggle between the central government and the Kurdistan 
Regional Government which officially share power over the territories.253 The unstable region 
of Kirkuk has also proved a challenge and faced difficult problems with property dispute 
resolution. The IOM, as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 
have continued to prove assistance with “local dialogue and negotiations” to address these 
disputes.254 Additionally, the government has not proved amenable to the policy of robust 
restitution. Instead, the Ministry of Finance regularly appeals any decision from the CRRPD 
that requires the government to financially compensate a victim or to relinquish government-
owned property.255 
 
The PCC did not have jurisdiction to address the property disputes arising from post-2003 
displacement. People facing property disputes from post-2003 displacement often have to rely 
on the local courts for assistance. This is in part because this crisis is ongoing and the 
government does not have the capacity to address property resolution at the moment.256 
However, the government did set up limited administrative help under the Council of 
Ministers Decree 262 and Order 101 to specifically address recovery for people displaced 
during 2006 and 2007 who met strict criteria (e.g. they were displaced to a neighboring 
country for less than eight months).257 Multiple agencies with unclear roles and few resources 
were assigned to these claims and there was no dedicated body or oversight.258 Claimants 
could submit claims at two return centers and go through the process, which was complicated 
and required significant documentation.259  
 
This process was not well known; only 500 or so applicants went through the centers (with 
about half succeeding in their claims) while 10,000 registered to receive a grant to help with 
resettlement (few received it).260 Secondary occupants of these homes, since they did not 
receive official state approval as they did during the Ba’ath regime, were subject to criminal 
sanctions.261 
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D. Lessons Learned  
 
There are several lessons that can be gleaned from Iraq’s uneven experience with land 
restitution and land reform. First, it is hard to properly assess the success of the PCC and 
the CRRPD: the ongoing, high levels of violence and displacement in the country never 
allowed the commissions to be truly tested. This suggests that, in any country where conflict 
and violence is ongoing, expectations for what land restitution and land reform systems can 
accomplish must be correspondingly lowered.  
 
Second, Iraq’s differing regions complicated efforts around land restitution. There were some 
attempts to address regional differences in Kirkuk and the Kurdistan regions, for example, 
but no systemic attempts to make the federal policy nuanced enough so as to incorporate all 
the relevant regional, ethnic and historical differences. More deliberate attempts to do so 
would likely have increased the success of the program and perhaps even have helped with 
broader reconciliation efforts, as groups that have been historically marginalized would have 
seen their concerns validated.  
 
The specific policies followed in Iraq, while not fully tested, generally provide guidance on 
how not to set up a land restitution system. The commissions have been criticized for the 
“isolated” approach that they took to property resolution; for failing to integrate in a cohesive 
manner with other country policies; and for failing to integrate many vulnerable groups into 
the property dispute resolution process: these trends suggest that, even were the context less 
volatile, the CRRPD would not have been able to significantly improve reconciliation and 
peace efforts in Iraq.262  
 
The setup of the Iraqi land dispute resolution system also shows how substantive flaws might 
be created by procedural flaws; in Iraq’s case, shown through its hurried, isolated, and non-
inclusive approach to setting up the system. The PCC and the CRRPD were pragmatic 
approaches to property disputes largely driven by the anti-Ba’ath politicians that took power 
following the 2003 invasion. This created two major problems with the system. First, the 
property dispute resolution mechanisms were created with a sense of urgency that made 
them isolated, rather than integrated into the broader attempt at transitional justice.263 
There was little effort to consider how to use the property dispute mechanism as a way to 
heal the country and prepare it for democratic governance. Instead, the second problem arose, 
the approach was non-inclusive and focused just on the targets of the Ba’ath regime.264 The 
administrative process addressing 2007–08 claimants has primarily been criticized for 
applying to an overly narrow subsection of potential claimants, and for poor administrative 
coherency.265 
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The Iraqi experience also demonstrates why administrative processes that minimize 
government involvement will often be preferable in land dispute resolution processes to 
judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms. As mentioned above, the decision of the Ministry of 
Finance to appeal almost all adverse decisions and the right to appeal for all parties, led to 
an enormous backlog in decisions and a lack of certainty over ownership.266 In addition, the 
decision to use a judicial, rather than an administrative process, similarly led to slow 
resolution of cases and was seen as the incorrect type of system given the huge number of 
cases to decide.267  
 
7) CASE STUDY 5: KOSOVO 
 
A. Background 
 
As with BiH and the other former Yugoslavian states, Kosovo’s complex experience with land 
restitution and land reform has been marked by ethnic conflict, political instability, and the 
move from a centrally-planned socialist economy to a market one. 268  Since gaining 
independence in 2008 and officially ending its period of international oversight in 2012, it 
has shown significant development of laws protecting property rights but successful 
implementation of these laws has proven more elusive.269   
 
A former part of the Ottoman Empire, Kosovo was split between the Kingdoms of Serbia and 
Montenegro following the First Balkan War in 1912–13, both of which eventually joined the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia following World War I. In 1937, a survey of Kosovar land was 
completed under the Turkish tapi system, which occurred without surveying measurements, 
using a piecemeal system marred by population movements driven by conflict.270 Albanians 
in Kosovo—the majority population but marginalized, often illiterate, and hesitant to pay 
steep tapi taxes—were essentially excluded from this process and their property was listed 
as government owned.271 The tapi system formally provided only possessory, not ownership 
rights, to land. This system remains at the “core” of land registration in Kosovo, although 
“informal land transactions” are most commonly used.272 
 
Temporarily a part of Albania during World War II, Kosovo became a part of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following the war. Kosovo was recognized as the Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo and Metohija, a part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. The majority of 
land remained in private use throughout the socialist era, but the state did take control 
(without compensation) of significant amounts of agricultural land known as socially owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and of urban land (“construction land”).273 The right to private land 
ownership was formally recognized in Kosovo by Yugoslavian law in 1989.274 
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Kosovo began pushing for increased independence as soon as 1981. This resulted in a 
backlash in which the Serbian-controlled government removed Kosovo’s autonomous 
governing authority by 1990.275 The following ten years are known as the “discriminatory 
period” for the discriminatory policies faced by the non-Serbian Kosovars, particularly 
Albanians. Discriminatory housing laws, such as legislation that canceled property sales by 
Serbs to Albanians, drove many Albanians from their homes.  
 
A war for Kosovo’s independence, within the context of the Yugoslav Wars, began in 1998. 
This war, the population displacement it caused, and the destruction of government buildings 
housing land registration documents destroyed many existing land titles.276 An intervention 
by NATO allowed Kosovo to reclaim its autonomy in 1999. Prior to 1999, Kosovo had no 
effective institutions for recording or defining land rights.277 
 
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) administered Kosovo until 2008 when 
Kosovo formally declared independence. Serbia still does not recognize its independence.278 
UNMIK did not alter the right to private land ownership granted to Kosovo by Yugoslavia.279 
It did set up the Housing and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims 
Commission to deal with controversy over land claims.280 UNMIK also established the Kosovo 
Trust Agency (KTA) to privatize the 12% of Kosovar land comprising SOEs. 281  The 
Privatization Agency of Kosovo (PAK) replaced the KTA in 2008. Since 1999, UNMIK, 
Kosovo, and other actors have worked to create a workable system of land rights in Kosovo. 
 
B. Property Rights and Claims  
 
There were several different groups with property rights and claims that had to be considered 
when Kosovo began land restitution and land reform after the 1998 war. These include the 
following: individuals who had owned property before socialization; individuals who lost 
property due to the discriminatory policies of the 1990s; individuals who fled from property 
during the war in 1998; individuals living in illegally built property; and minority 
populations, particularly Serbs. 
 
Individuals who owned property before socialization were of all ethnicities. These rights were 
largely supported by the flawed tapi records, discussed above, which left many Albanians 
with no formal rights over their ancestral property. Many of these land records had been 
destroyed during the war. 
 
Individuals who lost property due to the discriminatory policies of the 1990s were mainly 
Albanians. During this period, the central Serbian government revoked Kosovar autonomy 
and implemented policies that discriminated against non-Serbs in the province.  
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Individuals who fled from property during the war in 1998 were of all ethnicities and had 
often left their houses and apartments on short notice. In the months following the end of the 
war, many of these properties had been occupied by new residents without the permission or 
knowledge of the prior residents.  
 
Individuals living in illegally built property were primarily Kosovo Roma, Ashkaeli, and 
Egyptian communities. Many had lived in property for decades under informal terms. These 
properties were systematically destroyed during and after the war.282 
 
A final group that merited special attention during the Kosovar land restitution and land 
reform was minority populations, particularly Serbs. Although Serbia controlled Kosovo until 
1999, Serbs were a minority within Kosovo, who complained of discrimination at the hands 
of the local government.  
 
C.  Policy and Legal Responses  
 
The primary land reform approach applied in Kosovo was to privatize land through the sale 
of SOEs. 283  The KTA and its successor, the PAK, adopted the position that the prior 
ownership status of socialized land did not need to be determined.284 As such, this land is still 
being privatized and auctioned on an ongoing basis, generally in large parcels. While several 
other former Yugoslav states adopted a similar policy, many paired it with restoration of land 
where possible, compensation, or distribution of land, none of which Kosovo chose to 
pursue.285 Kosovo’s chosen policy has precluded the option of future physical restoration for 
land that was seized by the socialist Yugoslav regime.286 
 
The other primary policy was to return residential properties to their pre-war owners who 
had been displaced by the war or who had lost property due to the discriminatory housing 
policies of the 1990s (primarily Albanians).287 UNMIK set up a two-bodied mass claims 
mechanism under the Housing and Property Directorate (which ran the administrative body 
of the claims mechanism) and the Housing and Property Claims Commission (which was a 
quasi-judicial commission). These were later transformed into the Kosovo Property Agency 
(KPA) and the Kosovo Property Claims Commission with the same mandates. The judicial 
bodies were set up to complement the administrative bodies because the Kosovar judiciary 
was still fledgling and was not prepared to adjudicate the claims.288  
 
The Directorate (later KPA) had a number of roles in post-conflict Kosovo. It both provided 
guidance about the “overall direction” of Kosovar property rights and conducted an inventory 
of abandoned housing and aided in renting that housing.289 However, its primary role was 
resolving property disputes. Residential property claims were divided into three categories: 
claims by persons whose occupancy rights were revoked after March 23, 1989, based on 
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discriminatory legislation (these were primarily Albanians targeted by the discriminatory 
housing legislation of the 1990s) (Category A); claims by persons who voluntarily entered into 
informal transactions of residential property after March 23, 1989 (Category B); and persons 
who owned, possessed, or had occupancy rights to residential property prior to March 24, 
1999 but no longer had possession of the property and had not voluntarily transferred it 
(generally, refugees and IDPs) (Category C).290  
 
The Directorate considered claims made by individuals who had lost their residences. 
Claimants did not need to prove causation (for example, that the conflict had directly caused 
them to leave their homes), which removed a potential barrier to claimants’ success. The 
Directorate had the exclusive jurisdiction over claims under any of these categories. Its 
decisions were final, enforceable, and not subject to review by another body (though it could 
review its own decisions).291 Claims were only considered if submitted by a set deadline but 
that deadline was extended three times (until the final date of July 31, 2003).292 
 
Ultimately, the claim resolutions bodies succeeded in adjudicating 99.7% of the 
approximately 27,000 property claims before it, though far from all of these led to 
repossession of property, often due to security concerns and limited cooperation between 
agencies. 293  Category C claimants (displaced persons) lodged about 93% of claims. 294 
Restoration was the preferred outcome by the Directorate (though many individuals 
preferred to sell their houses once they obtained possession of them) and the Directorate 
rarely provided monetary compensation. The primary subset of cases where compensation 
was allowed was where there were competing occupancy claims. Compensation was allowed 
when a Category A individual was granted restoration of a residence that a Category C 
individual had purchased after the discriminatory policy had removed the property from the 
Category A individual. The Category C claimant, or secondary occupant, was then entitled to 
compensation for the purchase price paid.295  
 
Since the Directorate was facing a crisis with over a hundred thousand destroyed homes and 
few functional land records, it was given a conservative, narrow jurisdiction that was deemed 
manageable. 296  Specifically, agricultural land and other non-residential property were 
excluded from the restitution process; no compensation was available for most lost properties. 
Many criticized this approach as not adequately providing a comprehensive property dispute 
resolution scheme.  
 
Also, some noted that victims of discriminatory policies were given preference over those who 
had lost property as the result of the war.297 This was because, at the time the Directorate’s 
mandate was drafted, the huge number of displaced persons (generally Serbs) was not yet 
recognized and Albanians who had been victims of discriminatory policies had been 
understood to be the primary victims of the conflict.298 
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In 2006, the KPA replaced the Directorate. Its jurisdiction was expanded to include the 
ability to resolve disputes over agricultural and commercial property. 299  Claims were 
accepted until December 3, 2007, and any claims filed after that date are heard before general 
civil courts.  
 
D. Lessons Learned  
 
Several of the basic lessons learned from the Kosovo land restitution and land reform process 
mirror those first learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Those are addressed in the BiH 
section and not repeated here (see Part V.3).  
 
The land restitution and land reform project in Kosovo has generally not been seen as a 
success. USAID refers to Kosovo as having “poorly defined and enforced property rights,” 
particularly for women and minority communities.300 It is characterized by the “absence of 
an effective property rights regime.”301 This is in large part due to the fact that the rotating 
entities responsible for the state did not work to create a uniform property system, but 
instead left in place systems from various regimes that conflict with each other and added 
reforms without integrating them with the existing system (or explicitly abrogating the old 
system).302 As in BiH, the focus of the post-conflict land restitution and land reform was to 
return to the pre-conflict status quo, not to remake the system.  
 
Specific flaws from the post-war land policies are also apparent. For one, the setup of the 
Directorate unintentionally had a disparate impact on the Kosovo Serb population. It 
underestimated the number of displaced peoples in this population (about 100,000) and failed 
to adequately compensate them. Over 17,000 Kosovo Serbs ended up launching claims 
against UNMIK and other entities. The United Nations put aside most of these claims and 
few were ever tried.303 
 
Unlike in BiH, the Directorate also provided restitution for only residential, not commercial 
or agricultural, property (as it based the restitution on the principle of the “right to return 
home”).304 This negatively affected minority communities and the ability of many Kosovars 
to return to their pre-war economic activities, often agricultural.305  
 
The Directorate also provided no support for the Roma and other minority communities who 
had their longstanding, but informally owned, properties destroyed.306 This came in spite of 
international human rights protections, specifically from the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, for groups living in informal property schemes.307 The Roma and 
other minorities were essentially denied the right to return to their homes.  
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Limited cooperation between the Directorate/KPA and the “return” agencies (which helped 
displaced persons return to their homes) limited the success of property resolutions, showing 
that increased agency cooperation would have helped the success of the complaint resolution 
mechanism.   
 
Finally, the split in jurisdiction between the Directorate/KPA and regular courts created 
some confusion. It was not always easy to determine whether property claims fell under one 
of the categories over which the Directorate/KPA had a mandate. For example, where a claim 
fell under Category C but the original purchase was flawed, it would fall to a local court, not 
the Directorate/KPA, to determine the validity of that claim. These rulings often conflicted 
with the Directorate/KPA findings and left parties with no final resolution.308 
	
8) CASE STUDY 6: ZIMBABWE  
 
A. Background 
 
European colonists began to enter Zimbabwe in the 1850s, upsetting local community rule 
and property systems. The country, now known as Zimbabwe, was declared Rhodesia in 1890, 
and the country faced significant land grabs by the colonists who drove the African 
populations into reservations (now called communal lands).309 Land was given to “white” 
settlers and soldiers and taken from Africans without compensation. This became official 
under the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969.310 
 
Demands for independence began around 1960 and was marked by armed rebellion and 
sporadic battles until the country gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1980.311 
Zimbabwe’s land restitution and land reform efforts date back to this time, which marked 
the end of white minority rule, and were formalized in the 1980 Lancaster House Agreement. 
The challenge faced by the incoming government was enormous. As one might expect, 
Rhodesian white farmers had seized the vast majority of arable and fertile land. Indeed, 
approximately 6,000 large-scale white farmers owned nearly all arable, fertile land in the 
country.312 The government’s reform efforts sought, at least ostensibly, to redistribute land 
in a more equitable manner and improve the lot of landless black farmers. Throughout the 
years, Zimbabwe’s government failed repeatedly to carry out a uniform, preplanned process, 
but rather, continuously revised (sometimes drastically and with little respect for human 
rights) its policies in response to social, economic and political pressures. For this reason, it 
makes sense to divide Zimbabwe’s reform process into discrete phases, each of which is 
summarized below. 
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B. Property Rights and Claims 
 
There were several different groups with property rights and claims that had to be considered 
when Zimbabwe began to reform its land ownership and system following independence. The 
groups involved in this process were primarily white landowners from the colonial period and 
native black Africans. 
 
White landowners, as discussed above, had been given land by the colonial government prior 
to 1980, and had possession of a majority of the land in the country. 
 
Native black Africans had been dispossessed of much of their land during the colonial period, 
under formal and informal mechanisms. Many of these individuals were farmers or low-wage 
workers. At the time of independence, many were living on reservations and did not have 
their own property.   
 
C. Policy and Legal Responses  
 
Phase I – Consensual Land Sales: Following the Lancaster House Agreement, the new 
government promised not to force white farmers off their lands for a period of 10 years.313 
The government therefore adopted a policy where it would buy land from willing white 
farmers and redistribute the land to black peasants.314 Ultimately, some 3 million hectares 
were purchased and redistributed; far short of the government’s 8 million hectares goal.315 
Among the main reasons for the slow progress was the government’s diversion of funds for 
other purposes.316 Another important reason is that the government’s increased demand for 
large-scale land dramatically increased prices, resulting in holdouts by white farmers. The 
government determined that a more coercive mechanism was needed. 
 
Phase II – Coercive Acquisitions:   Starting in 1990, the government, no longer constrained 
by the Lancaster Agreement, began implementing more coercive measures. To this end, the 
government amended the constitution to permit compulsory land purchases. It also passed 
the Zimbabwean Land Acquisition Act of 1992.317 The bill empowered the government to 
coercively purchase land it deemed unproductive, but only in exchange for compensation. 
While the law did not require the government to pay full market value, it did give landowners 
some latitude to negotiate prices with the government; it also amended the constitution to 
enable land redistribution.318 It is also noteworthy that international donors supported this 
phase of land redistribution reform. Britain, for example, provided land assistance grants to 
facilitate redistribution and compensation.319  
 
But undermining the government’s legal efforts were a faltering economy and political 
cronyism. Indeed, by the late 1990’s, only around 1 million hectares were purchased and 
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redistributed.320 As of 1999, 4,500 farmers—most of them white—owned over 11 million 
hectares of all the country’s land.321 The causes were twofold. First, rather than distributing 
much of the purchased land to landless black farmers, the government gave the lands to 
ZANU-PF party loyalists—who were otherwise inexperienced with farming techniques.322 
These tracts were then rented for profit to the very people who were supposed to benefit from 
the program.   
 
Another contributing factor to the program’s dubious track record was Zimbabwe’s 
continuous economic decline. Throughout this period, Zimbabwe’s large-scale farmers 
continued to produce much of the country’s food supply and exports. Given the government’s 
reliance on these farmers’ output, many large-scale farms were left undisturbed.323  However, 
Zimbabwe’s dire economic prospects also had other, countervailing impacts. Perhaps most 
importantly, the ongoing economic calamity sharply increased political pressure on Mugabe 
to hasten the redistribution process by any means necessary.  
 
Phase III – Land Grabs: Responding to mounting popular pressure to hasten the reform 
process, the government first attempted to pass by referendum a constitutional amendment 
empowering the state to seize white farmland without compensation in 2000.324 When the 
amendment was defeated in a referendum, the government proceeded to (materially) support 
forceful seizures of farmland by army veterans and landless peasants. To lend a measure of 
legal legitimacy to the land grabs, the government passed the Rural Land Occupiers Act of 
2001.325 The act essentially shielded occupiers from legal sanction or eviction. 
 
In the meanwhile, the government launched what became known as the Fast Track Land 
Reform Program. The new redistribution program essentially codified the constitutional 
amendment that voters rejected in a referendum. The program had several salient features. 
First, it designated some 3,000 farms for compulsory acquisition, although in practice far 
more farms were seized.326 Rather than passing new legislation, the government simply 
deleted many due process procedures from the 1992 law, calling the amended version the 
Land Acquisition Act of 2000.327 Perhaps most importantly, the amended version empowered 
the government to seize land without compensation, aside from “improvements” made to the 
land.328 In addition, the 1992 law was amended to require only seven days’ notice before the 
government could forcibly seize the farm.329 In an effort to minimize court challenges, the bill 
was further amended to free the government from the obligation to personally serve the 
farmer with notice before seizing the farm. In practice, evictions were carried out, without 
even semblance of due process by paramilitary forces of army veterans linked to ZANU-PF.  
 
Once “acquired,” the land would be re-plotted. Some was to be plotted into large-scale farms, 
for which the government would earmark resources to invest in commercial agriculture. The 
remainder was to be re-plotted into small-scale farms, to be occupied by landless peasants.330 
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The process was beset by administrative difficulties and continuing violence. Indeed, much 
of the acquisition was accompanied with violent assaults on the original landowners. 
Moreover, given the government’s dwindling revenues, the newly resettled farmers received 
little to no government training or financial support. 331  As a result, the country’s once 
impressive food production plummeted, further increasing food insecurity and violence. As 
was common in previous redistribution efforts, much of the land was not redistributed based 
on need, but rather, on the basis of party loyalty.  
      
Ultimately, some 8.3 million hectares were seized and 127,000 blacks farmers were resettled 
a part of the Fast Track Land Reform Program.332 Some studies suggest that most of the land 
was distributed to landless black farmers and low-wage laborers in towns.333 Still, as can be 
expected, ZANU-PF loyalists and army veterans have received a disproportionate share of 
the land.334  Moreover, given the chaotic, violent nature of the redistribution program, few 
provisions were made for ousted black farmers who formerly lived on the land.335 They were 
often ousted, along with their employers, without even a veneer of due process or 
compensation.  
 
D. Lessons Learned 
 
Relevant lessons can be learned from each phase of Zimbabwe’s land restitution and land 
reform process. Zimbabwe’s largely unsuccessful “Consensual Land Purchase” policy imparts 
two lessons that may be pertinent to Myanmar, should its government opt to purchase and 
redistribute land to IDPs. First, it is important to set modest goals. Some experts suggest 
that it was never likely that Zimbabwe’s government could purchase so much land given its 
relatively modest resources—a problem which Myanmar’s government shares as well. 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, Zimbabwe’s effort illustrates that a purely 
consensual land restitution and land reform policy is likely unfeasible. That much is almost 
assured by the forces of supply and demand—as demand for land goes up, so do prices. The 
prospect of higher land values also makes holdouts more likely, necessitating some coercive 
measures.  
 
Ultimately, the relative inefficiency of a purely consensual land restitution and land reform 
regime, coupled with fledgling legal institutions, in turn makes grassroots violence a 
particularly likely outcome. It might therefore be better to combine a consensual regime with 
some coercive elements. 
 
Zimbabwe’s failure to achieve its redistribution objectives illustrates the importance of 
maintaining accountability and transparency in the redistribution process. Of course, the 
Fast-Track Redistribution program generated numerous additional impacts, beyond the 
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scope of this memo. However, it can be said with confidence that, to the extent that Myanmar 
contemplates a similarly ambitious land-reform process, Zimbabwe’s flagrant human rights 
and rule of law violations serve as a cautionary tale. As aforementioned, Zimbabwe’s 
longwinded reform process further illustrates the importance of maintaining transparency 
in the reform process, as well as the need to combine some coercive elements into an 
otherwise consensual land purchase/redistribution regime. Finally, in light of the challenges 
that accompany an undertaking as tremendous and complex as a land restitution and land 
reform program, it is important to set expectations modestly, particularly in a country where 
the rule of law remains weak. 
 
PART VI: OVERALL LESSONS LEARNED    
 
The case studies above illustrate successes, challenges, failures, and innovations in land 
restitution and land reform mechanisms. As illustrated in the Appendix, which subjects each 
case study to a compliance analysis with the Pinheiro Principles (discussed in detail in Part 
V.2.A), the case studies reveal broader insights that raise useful inquiries and considerations 
for Myanmar and other countries that are considering pursuing land reform or land 
restitution. 
	
	
	
Each country faces a gateway decision concerning the scope and ambition of its land 
restitution and land reform undertaking. In BiH and Kosovo, the goal was specifically to 
return those recently displaced to the status quo. 336  In Zimbabwe, the process proved 
impossible to implement in an effective and peaceful manner because it was expansive, 
ambitious and resource heavy.337   
 
The case studies demonstrate that focusing on the immediate conflict can help limit the 
number of implicated disputes and make the resolution process easier. However, where 
underlying reform is needed and not addressed, a narrow approach to dispute resolution may 
not fix necessary underlying issues. This is illustrated by the “neo-feudal”338 character of BiH 
today and the ongoing chaotic land situation in East Timor.339 In both situations, the land 
dispute resolution focused on relatively narrow subsets of the overall land scheme in the 
country. Even though the land dispute resolutions in both countries were seen as successful, 
1) DEFINE THE SCOPE: Properly defining the scope and providing a 
clear timeline for land restitution efforts facilitates effective 
implementation. In particular, it is important to determine at the 
outset whether the goal is to address immediate disputes  or take on the 
underlying, more complex legal and policy issues.  
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they did little to address these overarching issues facing land rights in the country, which 
continue to this day.    
 
This decision depends in part on the type of crisis and/or displacement the policy is meant to 
address. Zimbabwe was addressing the legacy of colonialism on land ownership (Part V.8) 
while Kosovo narrowly wanted to rectify displacement resulting from the 1990s conflict (Part 
V.7). The scope and nature of the corresponding land restitution and land reform efforts 
reflected those underlying drivers. In Myanmar, individuals with land disputes have been 
displaced in many different ways: some are IDPs and refugees displaced by conflict; others 
have faced land seizures so that land can be used by the government or companies (for more 
on the specific challenges facing land conflicts in Myanmar, see Part III). At the same time, 
fundamental reforms foreseen in the National Land Use Policy regarding clarification of 
customary land rights, are yet to be realized. This makes it particularly important for the 
scope and intentions of any land reform or land restitution program adopted in Myanmar to 
be very clear about whose claims and which underlying issues it is trying to address. 
	
 
The most successful processes in ongoing- and post-conflict environments appear to be 
flexible, tailored to local conditions and often rely on non-formal legal institutions. When 
creating land restitution and land reform policies, countries generally have to consider how 
to best adapt the mechanisms of these policies to their particular context and the strength of 
the legal sector. Some key facets are noting whether a chosen policy, as in Zimbabwe (Part 
V.8), is failing to adequately address the motivating policy concern and stopping or modifying 
that policy to prevent further damage. Taking into account the purpose of the land restitution 
is critical; in BiH, policymakers realized that land restitution had to include farm land in 
order to truly return people to the status quo and their former livelihoods, a consideration 
not fully appreciated in Kosovo (Parts V.3 and V.7). The East Timor example (Part V.7) also 
shows how local, community institutions can be incorporated into a formal government policy 
to improve its efficiency. 
 
2) FLEXIBILITY AND EVOLUTION: Approaches that are flexible and 
change as needs evolve tend to be more impactful.  
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Related to tailoring the solution to the country’s context, countries have to decide whether to 
structure their land restitution and land reform process in a way that is final or that is 
ongoing and adaptive to changes. While a finalized system with clear deadlines provides 
people with clarity and certainty, the land restitution and land reform process in Zimbabwe 
(largely unsuccessful as a model), demonstrates some of the reasons governments need to 
reflect on what has been a success and what has not when undertaking land reform and land 
restitution.340 Interim and short-term policies can allow flexibility for the government to 
adjust policies that turn out to be less successful than anticipated.   
There are three primary types of processes for restitution mechanisms: administrative, 
judicial (or quasi-judicial), and informal processes. A process can also incorporate aspects 
from several of these categories. There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these 
mechanisms and one may be more appropriate than the other depending on the context. Like 
Myanmar, East Timor and Iraq had significant number of refugees and IDPs. The experience 
of these countries demonstrates that, when dealing with a high number of claimants, a 
judicial or quasi-judicial process is sometimes inefficient. For example, in Iraq the judicial 
process led the government to hear too many cases, which created a bottleneck and ongoing 
confusion over land rights.341 Meanwhile, the informal mediation process used in East Timor, 
which included local community mediation outside of official state processes, resulted in high 
rates of successful resolution of claims and respect for traditional land rights.342  	
	
According to some estimates, approximately 57% of the land that has recently been 
confiscated in Myanmar was customary land.343  In such cases there is a need for land 
restitution and land reform programs to address the role that customary tenure has in the 
country, and the ability of actors to take advantage of the weaker formal legal protections for 
this land.  
 
3) DETERMINE FORMALITY OF MECHANISMS: Administrative, judicial, 
or informal approaches or some combination of the three should be used as 
appropriate to the particular context. 
4) INCORPORATE TRADITIONAL LAND RIGHTS: Traditional land rights 
should be accounted for in restitution mechanisms. 
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In two country studies, East Timor and BiH, incorporation of traditional land rights led to 
successful mechanisms.344 East Timor did so through its local mediation mechanism and BiH 
by recognizing the rights of residents of socially-owned land. Though it may be more 
administratively difficult to extend land restitution to land whose ownership cannot be 
proven through official land records, the experience in these countries shows that a 
comprehensive policy requires this inclusion. Failure to do so would exclude numerous 
landowners with traditional claims to land.      
	
Similarly, traditional or customary institutions can sometimes be more resilient in conflict 
than state institutions.345 This is seen through the greater degree of success experienced by 
the ad hoc mediation system in East Timor, based on local customs concerning land rights, 
than the formal administrative system created by the government. Post-conflict 
environments are often characterized by collapsed or weakened state structures. Therefore, 
customary institutions (where they exist) can be a first point of entry for addressing land 
disputes and it is useful to provide these traditional institutions with targeted support as 
more formal legal institutions become functional.346 
 
However, various considerations should be at the forefront when considering the use of 
customary institutions. For example, while incorporating customary practices demonstrates 
respect for indigenous peoples and their connection to land that they might not formally own, 
any land reform or land restitution policy must not re-entrench traditional power dynamics 
by not scrutinizing inequalities latent in customary practices. Section 13 discusses the 
importance of assessing whether a land tenure system, whether customary or statutory, has 
inadvertent human rights effects on minority or women populations.  
	
	
Part III of this Report explored the regional nature of  land use and land disputes in 
Myanmar, implicating varying types of customary tenure, armed conflict, parallel governing 
5) CONSIDER USE OF CUSTOMARY INSTITUTIONS: Traditional, local, 
and/or customary institutions can provide useful for a implementation of 
a restitution mechanism. 
6) ADOPT LOCAL, REGIONAL AND FEDERAL APPROACH: Local, regional 
and federal strategies should be incorporated into a land restitution 
policy to ensure proper coordination. 
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parties, and displacement of populations. Countries like Indonesia and Iraq have faced 
similar challenges with extreme regional differences. Experts on land restitution in 
Myanmar are divided about the implications of this regional variation: some think regional 
approaches must be attempted, while others believe a federal policy poses the best chance for 
success despite regional variation.347 The solution to this question is not an easy or clear 
one—just as it is not in countries like Indonesia and Iraq, which faced similar difficulties of 
implementing federal policies in semi-autonomous regions—but any attempt at land reform 
or land restitution in Myanmar must account for these regional differences, whether that is 
done by creating regional approaches or a federal program with the flexibility to respond to 
the different stakeholders and land disputes throughout the country.  
	
 
Myanmar, like many countries that undergo land restitution and land reform processes, such 
as Iraq and Zimbabwe, is still facing significant internal challenges. The experience from 
Iraq shows that, when conflict is ongoing, expectations should be tempered and attempts at 
land reform and land restitution shaped with the actual capacity of the government in mind. 
Facing similar contexts, some countries have favored a staggered approach where the initial 
steps are, as seen in East Timor,348 interim or stop-gap measures that stem the land crisis 
before a more broad-reaching policy can be applied once the country has stabilized.  
	
Each of the countries profiled also demonstrates the importance of a minimum set of reliable 
institutions being in place before land restitution can take place, which relates closely to the 
additional challenges that arise when a country attempts to undertake land restitution or 
land reform while conflict is ongoing. Specifically, weak, partisan, or underfunded agencies 
put in charge of land restitution in countries from Iraq and Zimbabwe to BiH and Kosovo at 
times compromised the potential success of land restitution (Part V, Sections 3, 6, 7, and 8).  
The limited attempts so far at confiscated farmland restitution (not of IDPs) that have 
occurred in Myanmar through the Investigation and Reinvestigation Committees 
demonstrate that this will likely be a challenge in the country, as agencies have faced high 
volumes of complaints and many failed to lead to “adequate redress.”349 These countries’ 
experiences show that robust judiciaries or separate, well-funded, and independent 
administrative adjudicative groups are essential to successful attempts at land restitution.  
7) CONSIDER A STAGGERED APPROACH: Where stability of the country 
and capacity of government is not reliable, a mechanism that upscales in 
stages may be preferable. 
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Restitution efforts run the risk of being short-sighted in that the immediate concern is 
resolving already existing land disputes. However, resolution of existing disputes should be 
made with an eye towards establishing or at least transitioning to a more stable system that 
will allow for effective resolution of future disputes.350 
 
The United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventative Action, which is run by 
the UN Development Program, recommends an institutional approach as “the only 
sustainable approach to systematically addressing land-related conflicts.” 351  Strong and 
coordinated institutions can help ensure that land grievances are addressed, that land 
disputes are regulated, and that land conflicts can be avoided. This helps the post-conflict 
period to result in a sustainable peace. Important institutions in this context include the 
national government, local governments, the judiciary, land administration institutions (both 
statutory and customary), and traditional/religious leaders. Reliable mechanisms for dispute 
resolution, generally independent from these institutions, must also be set up and 
coordinated with these other institutions. Dispute resolution mechanisms are necessary to 
ensure that these state organs can together work to successfully make, implement and 
enforce rules.  
 
Myanmar, as with most of the countries surveyed, also faces concerns over the additional 
problems created by land dispute resolution. Secondary occupants, for example, generally 
have few resources to move to new locations. One policy that addressed this issue was in BiH, 
where secondary residents were promised reciprocity and not required to relinquish their 
current housing until their previous housing, from which they had been displaced, was made 
available.352 Lesser protections for secondary residents and interim protections for those 
newly displaced were undertaken in East Timor, among other countries.353			
 
 
8) ACCOUNT FOR LONG-TERM INSTITUTION BUILDING: Long-term 
institution building should be a component of mechanism to ensure 
sustainability and effective transitions . 
9) POTENTIAL FOR INTERIM PROTECTIONS: Weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages of interim and transitional protections which may provide 
immediate relief. 
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Any land restitution policy has to decide whether to offer land compensation or restoration, 
or both. This is a complicated choice informed by both practical and political considerations. 
The country case studies presented demonstrate that land restoration has, in practice, 
generally been the preferred type of land restitution mechanism. The governments in BiH 
and Iraq,354 for example, did not have enough funds to start a robust compensation program, 
a reality likely facing Myanmar as well. Political concerns were also raised in BiH and 
Kosovo, among others, that compensation would lead to, in essence, an official approval and 
concreting of forced displacement and ethnic segregation. These on-the-ground outcomes 
track the guidance from literature such as the Pinheiro Principles and the Voluntary 
Guidelines that suggest restoration is generally preferred to compensation (as discussed in 
Part II.2).  
Many experts on land restitution in Myanmar similarly believe that restoration is likely the 
preferred form of restitution: people rely on specific types of land for their livelihood—return 
to just any land is not necessarily sufficient—and many also hold deep communal, ancestral, 
and cultural connections to the specific land from which they were dispossessed. 355  As 
discussed in Part III.4 of the Report, there are also concerns that many in Myanmar may not 
have the sophistication to properly invest compensation for land and such compensation will 
not succeed in putting that population into a comparable situation to where they were before 
their displacement.  
	
Still, there are countervailing considerations in Myanmar context, as in any country, brought 
up by experts interviewed for this study. In some circumstances land restoration is a 
significant challenge because of ongoing conflict and secondary occupants; sometimes the 
land was seized for a company or government project that is ongoing; some land has been 
promised to three, four, or even five parties over time that all believe they are the legitimate 
owner of the land.356 In addition, many refugees and IDPs, particularly from Karen state, 
have been displaced for over twenty years. After living in urban camps for decades—and, for 
younger people, not knowing anything else—many displaced persons may not wish to return 
to rural environments.357 
10)LAND RESTORATION OR COMPENSATION: Redress should be tailored 
to community needs and circumstances of the recipient and take into 
account relevant factors such as use of land and access to financial 
institutions . 
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The definitional choices made about land dispute resolution, even those that appear 
relatively minor, can have significant consequences. Country case studies provide insight 
into clauses that may end up having significant effects.	
	
Ø Burden of proof. In Kosovo, for example, claimants did not have to prove causation 
(e.g. that they lost their property as a result of the conflict) when putting in claims 
for loss of property. 358  This made the process more claimant-friendly and less 
administratively burdensome. Decisions about what burden of proof will be 
required to demonstrate ownership or other claim to land will be critical. 	
	
Ø Eligibility of Property. Another choice is what types of property are eligible for the 
resolution process, a choice highlighted in the Pinheiro Principles. While both 
residential and non-residential property was eligible in BiH, for example, Kosovo 
generally only provided resolutions for residential property.359 This is a particularly 
important decision when many claimants (e.g. farmers) might rely on non-residential 
land for their livelihood, as in Kosovo and Myanmar.   
	
Given the complicated domestic legal framework currently in Myanmar, experiences in BiH 
and Iraq concerning inconsistent laws and unclear precedence of laws and decisions may be 
relevant. The unclear patchwork of laws in Iraq played a significant role in preventing a more 
successful resolution of the land disputes there.360 Similar problems were seen in BiH at first, 
but the decision to make the CRPC’s binding decisions take precedence over conflicting laws 
allowed for the resolution process to achieve greater success.361 In Myanmar, this process 
should include not just making the legal structure consistent and clear, but also resolving 
the unclear legal state of refugees, IDPs, and residents of customary land.  
12)RESOLVING EXISTING CONFLICT OF LAND LAWS AND POLICIES: 
Review and survey of existing land laws and policies should identify 
inconsistent, unclear, or conflicting laws and either remedy them or 
identify which take priority. 
11)CONSIDER IMPLICATIONS OF DEFINITIONAL CHOICES : Making 
deliberate choices about legal definitions . 
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An explicit Pinheiro principle, and one whose importance can be seen in the case studies, is 
that any process should be non-discriminatory. This is also a requirement under the 
international treaties introduced in Part II. The legitimacy of processes that appear to favor 
one group or that have disparate effects on certain populations are more easily called into 
jeopardy and are often less effective at adequately addressing the underlying concerns, as 
seen in Iraq and Kosovo.362 There was a failure on the part of all the countries studied, to 
some degree, to comply with international standards regarding affirmative non-
discrimination against women, ethnic minorities, and indigenous people, as demonstrated by 
a lack of reliance on international treaties or law regarding the same. 
 
Discriminatory effects can be unintended or not immediately evident and so it is critical to 
consider the potential adverse human rights and equality implications of land restitution and 
reform mechanisms. For example, experts have noted that the formal registration of land 
where only one individual can be the owner of that land can lead to the formalization of a 
patriarchal land system, where the male head of household is listed as the owner of the 
land. 363   The incorporation of customary institutions and land tenure can raise similar 
concerns of discrimination on the basis of gender or other unlawful basis, as can the 
implementation of a statutory tenure system without proper consideration of the gendered 
effects it may have (such as giving formal title only to the male head of household). As such, 
any land restitution or land reform process must be scrutinized to assess and remedy 
discrimination impact at the outset.    
13)ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENSURE NON-DISCRIMINATION: 
Design a mechanism that includes ongoing assessment of potential for 
discrimination and adverse human rights impact in compliance with 
international standards. 
		
Appendix: Assessment Chart  
 
ASSESSMENT OF LAND RESTITUTION EFFORTS BASED ON PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES 
(UN PRINCIPLES ON HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS) 
 
 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
Was the land 
restitution and 
land reform 
process a 
success? 
Moderate:  
 
Within mandate to 
return land rights 
to pre-conflict 
status quo, seen as 
success. Did not 
address broader 
property concerns, 
specifically 
concerning vague, 
inconsistent laws. 
Moderate:  
 
Mediation model 
for addressing 
conflict was 
introduced by the 
UN Transitional 
Administration in 
2000 and is now 
managed by East 
Timor's Land and 
Property 
Directorate. 
Despite difficult 
circumstances 
and limited 
resources, 
mediation has 
been successful in 
managing a large 
number of 
potentially violent 
disputes. 
 
Too soon to tell:  
 
President Joko 
Widodo just 
announced 
Indonesia’s land 
reform program 
in Feb 2017, and 
funding from the 
World Bank was 
approved in 
March 2017. The 
grant is to help 
Indonesia’s 
indigenous and 
local 
communities 
secure land 
rights and 
manage forests.   
 
No:  
 
While some 
claimants were 
able to reclaim 
possession of 
houses, process 
was backlogged, 
slow, and political. 
Continuing 
turbulence in 
country affected 
ability of system to 
be truly tested. 
Low-moderate:  
 
Within mandate 
to return land 
rights to pre-
conflict status 
quo, successfully 
resolved many 
claims but with 
lingering 
concerns. Did 
not address 
broader property 
concerns, 
specifically 
concerning 
vague, 
inconsistent 
laws. 
No: 
 
Process 
accompanied 
by violence 
and 
paramilitaries. 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
To what extent 
was the state-
devised 
procedure 
transparent? 
Moderate Moderate:  
 
It was first 
implemented 
under supervision 
of United 
Nations. 
 
Moderate Moderate Moderate N/A 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
Did the state 
facilitate 
public access to 
reform 
program? 
Yes:  
 
Over 90% of those 
displaced by 
conflict received 
binding rights to 
their pre-conflict 
properties (though 
not all were able to 
repossess). 
Yes, generally:  
 
The East Timor 
Judicial 
Monitoring 
Program found 
that resolving 
land disputes 
through 
mediation was 
more effective 
than going 
through the court 
system; local 
settlements of 
disputes are seen 
as subject to less 
corruption, but a 
large limitation is 
that the 
Directorate 
cannot mediate 
land owned by the 
state, or where 
the state or 
government 
official  is a party 
to the dispute. 
 
Yes:  
 
The Indonesian 
government 
wants to reduce 
inequality by 
redistributing 
land to rural 
groups of people. 
12.7 million 
hectares are set 
aside to be 
distributed and 
managed by 
indigenous 
people. 
Yes:  
 
Active attempts to 
make process 
known included 
awareness 
programs and web-
based applications/ 
information. 
Yes: 
 
Final deadline 
for claims 
extended three 
times. Received 
27,000 claims. 
N/A 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
To what extent 
was there 
transparency 
when 
mechanism was 
created? 
N/A:  
 
But appears to 
have been 
transparent 
process: 
international 
community heavily 
involved, insisted 
on reliable 
monitors, 
commission 
reflected inclusive 
approach (ethnic 
diversity). 
 
Transparent:  
 
Originally created 
by the UN 
Transitional 
Administration. 
Relatively 
transparent: 
 
Largely created 
by Indonesian 
government, but 
also in 
conjunction with 
the World Bank. 
There has been 
much press 
covering the 
program.  
Low: 
 
Largely created 
within 
government. 
 
N/A:  
 
But appears to 
have been 
transparent 
process: 
international 
community 
heavily involved. 
High 
What was the 
level of 
transparency in 
resolution of 
each individual 
dispute? 
N/A:  
 
But appears to 
have been 
transparent process 
that followed 
procedures. 
Seems relatively 
transparent: 
 
A party brings the 
dispute and then 
the opposite 
parties are 
notified; 
mediation does 
not commence 
until all parties 
are present. 
 
N/A: 
 
Resolution of 
individual 
disputes has not 
yet occurred.  
High: 
 
Because of the 
judicial and appeal 
process, relatively 
high transparency 
about each case. 
N/A:  
 
But appears to 
have been 
transparent 
process that 
followed 
procedures. 
N/A 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
To what extent 
was the state-
devised 
procedure non-
discriminatory? 
High:  
 
Commission 
reflected ethnic 
diversity and 
policies adopted to 
ensure all ethnic 
groups treated 
equally. Some 
concerns about 
"victor's solution" 
regarding 
treatment of 
soldiers. 
 
Moderate:  
 
Given that the 
disputes are 
mediated at a 
local level, 
discrimination is 
probably 
lessened. 
However, the 
state and 
government 
officials are 
exempt from this 
mediation. 
Moderate: 
 
The program’s 
purpose is to 
increase welfare 
of rural 
communities and 
indigenous 
people. However, 
the details of the 
program are 
unclear.  
Low:  
 
Process was 
generally seen to 
favor majority Shia 
in power post-
2003. Informal 
renters or farmers 
with poor 
documentation 
(often minorities) 
had no recourse. 
Low-moderate:  
 
Process was 
facially non-
discriminatory 
but ended up 
favoring 
displaced 
Albanian 
population over 
Serbs, no 
protections for 
minority 
populations 
(such as Roma).  
 
Low:  
 
Process was 
highly 
discriminatory
. 
To what extent 
was the state-
devised 
procedure 
gender-
sensitive? 
No prominent 
efforts to integrate 
gender-sensitive 
approach. 
N/A No prominent 
efforts to 
integrate gender-
sensitive 
approach. 
No prominent 
efforts to integrate 
gender-sensitive 
approach. 
No prominent 
efforts to 
integrate 
gender-sensitive 
approach. 
Concerns that 
property system 
more broadly 
unfair to women. 
 
N/A 
 
What type of 
property was 
eligible for 
claims? 
All (residential, 
commercial, 
agricultural) 
All land Agrarian land  All real estate Residential N/A 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
Are agencies 
assigned to deal 
with restitution 
program 
properly staffed 
given their 
caseload? 
Yes:  
 
Dispute resolution 
committee (CRPC) 
appears to have 
been adequately 
staffed, though it 
relied on local, 
domestic agencies 
for implementation 
of decisions. 
 
Yes:  
 
Appears to be 
properly staffed. 
Too soon to tell: 
 
The Indonesian 
government has 
urged regional 
administration to 
coordinate with 
relevant agencies 
to speed the 
implementation 
of agrarian 
reform program. 
No:  
 
Significant backlog 
of cases, at initial 
decision and 
appeal level. 
Yes:  
 
Dispute 
resolution 
committees 
(Directorate, and 
others) appear to 
have been 
adequately 
staffed. 
Hindered by 
poor agency 
cooperation. 
No 
Are agencies 
assigned to deal 
with restitution 
program 
properly 
funded? 
Yes:  
 
CRPC appears to 
have been 
adequately funded. 
Compensation 
Fund, which was 
supposed to be 
funded by 
international 
donors and support 
monetary 
compensation, was 
not funded. 
 
Yes:  
 
Appears to be 
adequately 
funded, mediation 
activities are 
funded by the 
Directorate, 
which is a self-
funding agency as 
a result from 
leases over public 
land. 
Likely yes: 
 
Appears to be 
adequately 
funded; the 
World Bank has 
approved a 
$6.25M grant to 
help specifically 
with Indonesia’s 
indigenous 
communities.  
No:  
 
Compensation 
depended on 
government 
providing 
compensation, 
which rarely 
occurred. 
Yes:  
 
Dispute 
resolution 
committees 
(Directorate, and 
others) appear to 
have been 
adequately 
funded. 
No 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
To what degree 
were agencies 
independent 
from state or 
partisan 
control? 
High:  
 
International 
community heavily 
involved, insisted 
on neutrality. 
Initial problems 
with local 
obstruction were 
addressed. 
Moderate: 
 
At the beginning, 
it was 
implemented by 
the UN, but now 
it is run by a 
directorate most 
likely tied to the 
state; when 
mediators are not 
mediating, they 
are performing 
other land 
administration 
duties. 
Moderate: 
 
It seems as 
though the bulk 
of the on-the-
ground 
implementation 
will be through 
regional 
administrative 
agencies, with 
oversight from 
the state. 
 
Moderate:  
 
CRRPD/PCC were 
independent, but 
government had 
control over some 
aspects of process. 
High: 
 
International 
community 
heavily involved, 
insisted on 
neutrality. 
Low:  
 
Process co-
opted by 
ZANU-FP 
(ruling party). 
Does the state 
provide specific 
guidelines to 
particular 
agencies so as 
to ensure 
standardized 
institutional 
practices? 
Yes At the outset, yes:  
 
The mediators 
received intensive 
training in 2001 
and 2005 but 
there are no 
mechanisms for 
ongoing or 
recurrent 
mediation 
training. 
 
Unclear: 
 
It is too soon to 
know the details 
of the program.  
Yes Yes No:  
 
Land largely 
distributed on 
basis of party 
affiliation. 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
What was the 
proportion of 
IDPs that 
submitted a 
claim to the 
agency tasked 
with 
implementing 
the program, 
and how 
quickly were 
these claims 
resolved? 
N/A, but high 
proportion:  
 
Two million were 
displaced and 
within nine years, 
one million had 
returned. 
About a third: 
 
 
Of the 972 
disputes brought 
to the Land and 
Property 
Directorate 
between 
December 2000 
and January 
2006, 314 were 
resolved through 
mediation. 
N/A: 
 
 
Still unclear.  
N/A: 
 
 
But about one 
million were 
displaced 
(internally and 
abroad) due to 
policies related to 
CRRPD/PCC 
mandate and about 
150,000 claims 
were placed by 
2009. 67,000 had 
been resolved. 
 
N/A: 
 
 
But high 
proportion. 
N/A: 
 
 
Recipients 
were not 
IDPS. 
What was the 
proportion of 
IDPs whose 
land rights 
have been 
restored, or 
alternatively, 
have been given 
restitution, 
since the 
inception of the 
restitution/ 
restoration 
program? 
High: 
 
Within nine years, 
90% of claimants 
displaced by 
conflict received 
binding rights to 
their pre-conflict 
properties (though 
not all were able to 
repossess). 
N/A N/A Low: 
 
By 2009, about 
67,000 of 150,000 
claims were 
resolved. Only 
1,000 had been 
compensated. 
Significant backlog 
(claims and 
appeals). 
High:  
 
99.7% of 27,000 
claims 
completed, 
generally 
resulting in 
returning land 
rights. 
Moderate: 
 
127,000 (total, 
vast majority 
not IDPS). 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
 
To what extent 
were affected 
IDP 
communities  
consulted as to 
the reform 
efforts and 
what were the 
means by which 
consultations 
were 
implemented? 
 
N/A: 
 
Appears low – 
driven by 
international, 
government actors. 
N/A: 
 
Mediation 
mechanism. 
 
Success: 
 
Significant 
consultation on ad 
hoc community 
dispute 
resolution. 
N/A: 
 
Appears to be a 
top-down reform 
by the state in 
conjunction with 
international 
actors. 
N/A: 
 
Appears low – 
driven by sitting 
government. 
N/A: 
 
Appears low – 
driven by 
international, 
government 
actors. 
Low: 
 
Process largely 
designed by 
ZANU-PF. 
To what extent 
did the state 
provide an 
effective means 
to register land 
that has been 
restored to its 
original 
owners? 
Moderate: 
 
Restored land was 
filed in newly 
created "cadastral 
database," though 
not if claimant did 
not originally have 
formal property 
rights.  Property 
system overall 
remains poorly 
managed. 
 
N/A High: 
 
Indonesia has an 
extensive 
registration 
system, but is 
ineffective in its 
high cost and 
poor 
management. 
High: 
 
Registration 
available, 
including through 
online system. 
Moderate: 
 
Restored land 
was registered, 
though not if 
claimant did not 
originally have 
formal property 
rights. Property 
system overall 
remains poorly 
managed. 
N/A 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
 
Extent to which 
reform effort 
incorporates 
and recognizes 
customary 
means of 
property 
ownership (i.e: 
collective 
means of 
ownership) 
 
High: 
 
Process recognized 
rights of those who 
had occupied 
socially-owned 
property. 
High: 
 
This mediation 
program was 
created to address 
disputes over 
customary land 
ownership. 
High: 
 
The agrarian 
land reform 
program is 
targeted towards 
restoring land to 
customary 
communities.  
Low: 
 
Process recognized 
only those with 
significant 
documentation of 
claim. 
Low: 
 
Process did not 
recognize rights 
of those in illegal 
housing. 
Low: 
 
Uniform 
registration 
process. 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
 
In case of an 
undocumented 
claim (physical 
evidence of an 
IDPs ownership 
has been 
destroyed or 
does not exist), 
has the state 
provided for an 
impartial, 
speedy judicial/ 
administrative 
procedure by 
which to 
determine facts 
related to such 
undocumented 
claims? 
 
N/A N/A N/A N/A, but appears 
low:  
 
Process recognized 
only those with 
significant 
documentation of 
claim. 
N/A N/A: 
 
Recipients 
were not 
IDPS. 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
 
Has the state 
provided for a 
means to 
address and 
protect the 
human rights of 
legitimate 
secondary 
owners acting 
in good faith? 
Yes: 
 
Condition of 
reciprocity. 
N/A N/A Yes: 
 
Compensation. 
Yes: 
 
Generally, 
compensation. 
No: 
 
White farmers 
largely forced 
off their land 
absent any 
compensation. 
Are (and the 
extent to which) 
implementation 
efforts carried 
out through the 
rule of law? 
Yes Yes: 
 
The mediation 
system is 
embedded in land 
administration 
rather than 
judicial 
administration, 
which allows 
remedies 
unavailable in the 
courts, such as 
selling, leasing, 
dividing, or 
swapping land. 
 
Yes Yes Yes No:  
 
Coercive 
evictions were 
largely carried 
outside legal 
process by 
violent 
paramilitary 
groups. 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
Has the state, 
through 
implementing 
statute(s), 
clearly 
delineated 
those entitled to 
restitution/land 
restoration? 
Yes:  
 
Individuals who 
had abandoned 
their property 
during the 1990s 
conflict, including 
those without 
formal property 
rights.  
 
Not those who had 
their property 
socialized under 
Yugoslavia. 
N/A Yes Yes:  
 
Individuals who 
had property 
seized or lost due 
to displacement, 
discriminatory 
policies under 
Ba'ath regime.  
 
Not those whose 
property was 
damaged. 
Yes:  
 
Individuals who 
lost property due 
to the 
discriminatory 
policies after 
1989; 
individuals who 
voluntarily 
entered into 
informal 
transactions of 
residential 
property after 
1989; 
individuals who 
fled from 
property during 
the war in 1998–
99.  
 
Not those who 
had their 
property 
socialized under 
Yugoslavia. 
 
No 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
 
What form of 
restitution 
offered to IDPs 
was favored? 
Restoration. Selling, leasing, 
dividing, or 
swapping land. 
Restoration. Restoration. Restoration. N/A : 
 
Recipients 
were not 
IDPS. 
 
If monetary 
restitution: Did 
an independent 
tribunal 
determine that 
restoration of 
land rights was 
not possible? 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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 COUNTRY 
FACTOR BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 
EAST TIMOR INDONESIA IRAQ KOSOVO ZIMBABWE 
If addressed 
through 
restoration: 
Has the state 
provided a 
monetary 
restitution 
mechanism for 
those who do 
not wish to 
return 
voluntarily? 
No: 
 
A Compensation 
Fund was 
envisioned but 
funding relied on 
international 
donors and was 
never realized. 
N/A No No: 
 
Compensation was 
theoretically 
possible for most 
claimants, but 
rarely paid by 
government. 
Sometimes: 
 
Only particular 
groups were 
eligible: 
secondary 
occupants 
during the 
conflict, where 
original owner 
lost property due 
to 
discriminatory 
laws (this group 
was favored in 
restoration 
process). 
 
N/A 
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